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ARTICLES
MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT CLAUSES: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
Dale A. Whitman*
Most mortgages on income-producing real estate (as distinct
from owner-occupied housing) contain clauses restricting early pay-
ment of the loan. These clauses are highly controversial, and bor-
rowers often resist their enforcement. While other writers have
discussed prepayment clauses in the recent legal literature,' my
objectives in this Article are to advance this discussion in three re-
spects: first, to provide an economic perspective on mortgage pre-
payment as support for a set of legal recommendations; second, to
* Guy Anderson Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful discussions and
comments on earlier drafts of this paper by Frank S. Alexander, Robert S. Cooter,
James D. Gordon III, Herbert Hovenkamp, James Kearl, Grant S. Nelson, and Chester
S. Spatt. All faults and errors are, of course, attributable to the author rather than these
generous colleagues.
1. See Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial of Common Sense,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 288 (1987); T. Craig Harmon, Prepayment Penalties: Predicting
Controversy over Enforceability Based upon the Late Due-On-Sale Question, I REAL
EST. FIN. L.J. 326 (1986); Alan M. Weinberger, Neither an Early Nor a Late Payor
Be?-Presuming to Question the Presumption Against Mortgage Prepayment, 35 WAYNE
L. REV. 1 (1988); Robert K. Baldwin, Note, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and Sug-
gestion, 40 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1987); Michael T. McNelis, Note, Prepayment Penalties
and Due-on-Sale Clauses in Commercial Mortgages: What Next?, 20 IND. L. REV. 735,
754-55 (1987); Rosemary G. Schikora, Comment, Prepayment Penalties After Garn-St.
Germain: A Minor Coup for Consumers, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 835.
Earlier articles include Jack F. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in
Real Estate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues
and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 267 (1972); Ellis J. Harmon, Comment, Secured
Real Estate Loan Prepayment and the Prepayment Penalty, 51 CAL. L. REV. 923 (1963).
See also GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§§ 6.1-.5 (2d ed. 1985) for a general discussion of prepayment clauses.
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consider whether the bankruptcy of the mortgagor should affect en-
forceability of a prepayment fee clause; and third, to analyze the
cumulative effect of the presence in the same mortgage documents
of both a clause imposing a fee upon prepayment of the loan and a
clause accelerating the loan in the event of default, sale, eminent
domain taking, or hazard insurance payoff.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Due-on-Sale Background
By using prepayment restrictions, lenders attempt to protect
themselves against the vagaries of interest rate cycles. When rates
fall, borrowers are inclined to prepay, depriving lenders on fixed-
rate mortgage loans of the benefit of the existing contract rate.2
Prepayment restrictions seek to mitigate or prevent that depriva-
tion. When rates rise, on the other hand, lenders on fixed-rate loans
desire prepayment. The due-on-sale clause permits the lender to
demand early payment if the real estate is transferred.3 Prepayment
restrictions and due-on-sale clauses are thus opposite sides of a coin,
the former significant in a falling rate market and the latter in a
rising rate market. Because the economic history of the last twenty-
five years is primarily one of extremely volatile and generally rising
rates, due-on-sale clauses have been the subject of much more in-
tense scrutiny in the courts and legislatures than prepayment
clauses. It is helpful to review this controversy in setting the stage
for a consideration of prepayment clauses.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the enforceability of due-on-sale
clauses was the subject of an intense legal battle waged for enor-
mous stakes between lenders and borrowers. During much of that
time, portfolio lenders-savings and loan associations and others
that typically retain loans in portfolio rather than sell them in the
secondary market-held large quantities of real estate loans made
2. It is really more than just loss at the contract rate. The lender has typically
funded the loan by borrowing, matching the term of its borrowings against its expecta-
tions under the term of the mortgage. The lender doesn't have attractive investment
opportunities once the loan prepays because it has funded the original loan at high rates
and now only has lower rate investment opportunities.
3. The literature is vast. See, e.g., Richard C. Maxwell, The Due-on-Sale Clause:
Restraints on Alienation and Adhesion Theory in California, 28 UCLA L. REV. 197
(1980); A. Mark Segreti, Jr., The Borrower as Servant to the Lender: Enforcement of
Mortgage Due-on-Sale Clauses, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1982); Ronald R. Volkmer,
The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Inter-
ests, 58 IOWA L. REV. 747, 768-801 (1973). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 1, § 5.21 n.9 (citing many additional articles, notes, and comments).
[Vol. 40:851
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in earlier periods which bore interest yields considerably lower than
current mortgage rates.4 Mortgages that contain enforceable due-
on-sale clauses permit lenders to accelerate their loans when the real
estate is sold and to compel a payoff, so that in a rising interest
market the funds can be relent at the higher current rates. Alterna-
tively, a lender can employ the clause as leverage to persuade the
purchaser of the real estate to agree to an increase in the interest
rate or the payment of a substantial "assumption fee" as the price of
the lender's waiver of its right to accelerate. In either scenario, the
clause allows the lender to increase the interest yield on its portfolio
when a sale of the secured real estate occurs. In effect, the clause
converts the fixed-rate mortgage loan into a partially effective but
nonetheless highly useful adjustable rate mortgage.5
The due-on-sale clause has a second function as well. It per-
mits lenders to evaluate the credit history, income, and other char-
acteristics of prospective purchasers of the real estate and to refuse
to finance those whose characteristics are unsatisfactory under the
lender's loan underwriting criteria. This function is by no means of
trivial importance; in many situations it is crucial that the lender be
able to avoid the increased risk of default that an uncreditworthy
4. In November 1981, at the peak of the rate cycle, the effective contract interest
rate on new mortgage loans made by all major lenders on previously-occupied houses
was 16.38%. See FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BD., SAVINGS & HOME FINANCING
SOURCE BOOK 66 (1982). Yet for FSLIC-insured savings associations, the average re-
turn on mortgage portfolios for the second half of 1981 was only 10.07%. Id. at 58. As
the title to an article published during this era in the savings industry press suggested,
Old Loans Never Die, They Just Eat Up Profits. SAVINGS & LOAN NEWS, Jan. 1982, at
108.
5. See Kenneth B. Dunn & Chester S. Spatt, An Analysis of Mortgage Contracting:
Prepayment Penalties and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 40 J. FIN. 293, 294 (1985) ("[Ain
adjustable-rate loan or hedging in the financial market provides the lender with better
protection from interest rate risk than a due-on-sale clause."). Dunn and Spatt regard
the due-on-sale clause as imposing a form of prepayment penalty; the clause both com-
pels prepayment when the real estate is sold and also requires the borrower to pay at par
(i.e., the face amount of the loan balance) when in reality the loan may have a consider-
ably lower market value because of increases in market interest rate. The difference
between the loan's market value and the amount the lender requires to discharge it is, in
effect, a prepayment penalty. Lenders do not always require payment at par, despite the
fact that the due-on-sale clause gives them the right to do so; they may accept payment
at a discount, which is frequently reflected in the lender's willingness to refinance the
loan at a "blended" rate that is somewhat below current market rates. Dunn and Spatt
provide an economic rationale for this practice by lenders. Id.
While this sort of payment in excess of the loan's market value may be regarded as
a prepayment penalty in an economic sense, it is not the principal focus of this Article,
which is mainly concerned with explicit prepayment fees. Such fees are sometimes ex-
acted by lenders in conjunction with the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-163.
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purchaser presents. Nevertheless, in periods of rising interest rates,
the due-on-sale clause's rate adjustment function, described above,
is far more significant economically than its credit-risk avoidance
function.
Portfolio lenders were under severe financial pressure during
the 1979-1981 period. They were obliged to pay extremely high
interest rates on savings deposits and other sources of funds, while
the yields on their portfolios of fixed-rate mortgage loans rose only
gradually. The dangers of funding long-term lending with short-
term borrowing became starkly clear to them.6 Many lenders re-
gretted that they had not been making adjustable-rate loans during
the previous decade. 7 From their viewpoint, the due-on-sale clause
was the only bright spot in an exceedingly bleak landscape. They
were understandably disheartened when courts and legislatures in
about a dozen states held that such clauses were unenforceable ex-
cept when the credit or other personal characteristics of the pro-
posed purchaser of the real estate were objectively unacceptable. 8
6. In the second half of 1981, while the average return on mortgage portfolio to
insured savings associations was 10.07%, the average cost of funds (primarily savings
deposits) to those same institutions was 11.53%. See FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK
BD., supra note 4, at 56, 58. Thus most institutions were losing net worth every day
they were open for business! As one economist summarized the situation:
When short-term interest rates rose from approximately seven percent in
1978 to sixteen percent in 1981, SLAs faced a run off of deposits ($25
billion in 1981 and $6 billion in 1982) while they still held mortgages
paying an average of nine to ten percent. Further, while Congress began
to deregulate deposit interest rates in 1980, which helped stem the out-
flow of depositors' funds, this served to increase the thrifts' cost of funds
to the point where interest margins often were negative.
GEORGE J. BENSTON, SOLOMON BROS. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INSTS., AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION FAILURES 2 (1985).
7. As one savings association president put it, "We should have forced the govern-
ment to come up with adjustable mortgage loans 10 years ago." See Beth M. Linnen &
John N. Frank, Battered, the Business Hangs on in a Horrid Year, SAVINGS & LOAN
NEWS, Apr. 1982, at 36, 37.
8. For a review of the state cases and other judicial decisions restricting due-on-
sale enforcement, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.22.
For economic analyses of the importance of the due-on-sale issue to the thrift in-
dustry, see FREDERICK E. BALDERSTON, THRIFTS IN CRISIS: STRUCTURAL TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 42-53 (1985); J. Kimball Dietrich et
al., The Economic Effects of Due-on-Sale Clause Invalidation, 2 HOUSING FIN. REV. 19
(1983). The latter work estimates that the decision of the California Supreme Court in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77 (Cal. 1978), which held due-on-
sale clauses unenforceable unless the lender's security or risk position was impaired,
caused a loss of 45% in value of the mortgages held by state-chartered thrift institutions
in California. See also Mark Meador, The Effects on Mortgage Repayments of Restric-
tions on the Enforcement of Due-on-Sale Clauses: The California Experience, 10 AM.
REAL. EST. & URn. ECON. ASS'N J. 465, 471 (1983) (estimating that the Wellenkamp
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In response, they appealed to Congress to preempt these state stat-
utes and decisions and to authorize all lenders in the nation to en-
force due-on-sale clauses, even in cases where a lender's sole
motivation was to increase the yield on its portfolio.
Congress acceded to the lenders' wishes by enacting section
341 of the Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. 9
The "Gain Act" gave the lenders nearly everything they wanted. It
declared due-on-sale clauses enforceable as a matter of national pol-
icy, preempting contrary state law.10 At the same time, in an inge-
nious political compromise, it protected borrowers in states that
had legal restrictions on due-on-sale enforceability. By suspending
the imposition of federal law for three years in these states, the
Gain Act protected borrowers who might thus have obtained loans
under the impression that these restrictions would apply to them.I
It also exempted a set of "minor" transfers of real estate (transfers
to family members, passage of title at death, and the like) because
Congress considered due-on-sale enforcement to be unfair in such
situations. 12 These sorts of transfers were declared not to trigger
due-on-sale clause enforcement, at least on one-to-four-family
case seriously reduced mortgage repayments to state-chartered savings associations dur-
ing 1981, resulting in a loss to those institutions of $58 million to $170 million); Larry
Ozanne, The Financial Stakes in Due-On-Sale: The Case of California's State-Chartered
Savings and Loans, 12 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N J. 473 (1984).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1988).
10. "Notwithstanding any provision of the constitution or laws (including the judi-
cial decisions) of any State to the contrary, a lender may ... enter into or enforce a
contract containing a due-on-sale clause .... " Id. § 1701j-3(b)(l).
11. The Act protects borrowers who obtained or assumed mortgage loans during a
"window period" which commenced on the date state law rules restricting due-on-sale
enforcement became effective and which lasted until the Act's effective date, October
15, 1982. These "window period" loans were made exempt from the federal preemption
until October 15, 1985, and state legislatures were given the authority to extend this
protection beyond that date. Id. § 1701j-3(c)(1); see Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whit-
man, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the Garn-
St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1983) (containing an extended analysis of the
window period rules).
The window period concept is rapidly becoming irrelevant; only five states ex-
tended the protection for window-period loans beyond 1985, and even in them, only
pre-October 15, 1982 loans are affected. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1571 (Supp.
1988) (extension expired Oct. 15, 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1625 (West
1989) (permanent extension); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20.6c (West 1988) (extension ex-
pired Oct. 1, 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-19 (Michie 1987) (permanent extension);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-15-11 (repealed 1986) (permanent extension).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (1988).
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homes, and that declaration was also made preemptive of state
law. 13
B. Prepayment Clauses in the Market
While the Garn Act settled the principal debate over due-on-
sale clause enforceability, it dealt effectively with only half of the
underlying problem of interest rate volatility. Due-on-sale clauses
are designed to protect lenders by permitting them to adjust their
portfolios' yields upward when interest rates have risen after the
loan was made. Thus, they approximate the effect of an adjustable
rate mortgage (ARM) loan, permitting the interest to be adjusted
upward as the underlying real estate is transferred. But lenders also
have a serious concern about the other side of the interest rate cycle.
When rates fall, borrowers frequently wish to prepay their mortgage
loans by obtaining new and cheaper financing from other sources.14
Lenders naturally wish to maintain the yields on their portfolios in
such periods-to have "call protection," in bond market terms-
and hence have developed various mortgage clauses to restrict pre-
payment or to permit it only upon the payment of an additional fee.
As a practical matter, these clauses have virtually disappeared
in loans secured by single-family homes and are of interest primar-
ily in income-producing real estate such as apartment buildings, of-
fices, and shopping centers or other retail space. A number of states
have sharply restricted their use in the home loan setting by stat-
ute. 15 More importantly, both the Federal National Mortgage As-
13. The original 1982 version of the Act exempted these sorts of transfers even with
respect to mortgages on commercial property, but an amendment, effective November
30, 1983, provided that they are insulated from acceleration only if the mortgaged real
estate contains "less than five dwelling units." Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 473, 97 Stat. 1153, 1237 (1983). The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board's original regulation interpreting the Act had attempted to limit these ex-
emptions to loans secured by borrower-occupied homes, see 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b) (1992)), but it is doubtful whether the Board was
within its authority in doing so. For further analysis of this issue, see NELSON & WHIT-
MAN, supra note 1, § 5.24.
14. The relationship between market rates and the probability of prepayment of
existing mortgages is demonstrated empirically in Jerry Green & John B. Shoven, The
Effects of Interest Rates on Mortgage Prepayments, 18 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING
41 (1986).
15. States imposing such restrictions include California, Illinois, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Statutory references are found in NELSON & WHIT-
MAN, supra note 1, § 6.4 and Baldwin, supra note 1, at 430-34. See Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Minassian, 777 F. Supp. 385, 390 n.1 (D.N.J. 1991) (discussing New Jersey
statute); Donahue v. LeVesque, 215 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Ct. App. 1985) (statutory privilege
of free prepayment applies even to a purchase-money mortgage given to a land vendor,
[Vol. 40:851
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sociation (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC), the two principal federally sponsored enti-
ties purchasing mortgages on the secondary market, announced
that beginning in 1980 they would no longer accept home mortgage
loans containing prepayment fee clauses. 16 Since the vast majority
of home loans in the nation are written on the standard FNMA-
FHLMC mortgage and note forms, and since these forms now insist
upon free prepayment, the legal issues surrounding prepayment are
of little current importance in home lending. 17 While a few institu-
tional home lenders and individuals (e.g., sellers of houses who take
where prepayment is made after the calendar year of the sale); Skyles v. Burge, 789
S.W.2d 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Weinstein v. Investors Say. & Loan Ass'n, 381 A.2d
53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (statutory restrictions on prepayment fees apply
only to mortgages entered into after legislation's effective date); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 82.160-.170 (1987) (requiring a prominent notice in the loan agreement of a lock-in
or prepayment fee, and not limited to residential mortgages); Schnitzer v. State Farm
Life Ins. Co., 773 P.2d 387 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter UCCC] prohibits collection of
prepayment penalties (with some qualifications) on real estate loans for personal, family,
household, or agricultural purposes with interest rates exceeding 12%. See UCCC
§ 2.209, 7 U.L.A. 659 (1968); UCCC § 2.509, 7A U.L.A. 96 (1974). The UCCC and
variants of it are in effect in about eleven states.
16. FNMA Press Release, Sept. 17, 1979. The current FNMA/FHLMC MULTI-
STATE FIXED RATE NOTE, SINGLE FAMILY (May 1991) states, "I may make a full
prepayment or partial prepayments without paying any prepayment charge." See
FNMA CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE SELLING CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT
§ 301.05; FHLMC SERVICER'S GUIDE § 4.113. Both FNMA and FHLMC continue to
require prepayment fees in their multifamily mortgage programs. See California Fed.
Bank v. Matreyek, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58 (Ct. App. 1992); FNMA Rider to Multifamily
Instrument, Form 4059 (Apr. 1988), at clause A; Ann J. Dougherty, Calculating Yield
Maintenance Premiums, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS, Winter 1989-90, at 33
(describing FHLMC prepayment charges on multifamily mortgages).
17. Professor Frank Alexander, in his thorough 1987 analysis of the prepayment
issue, suggested that prepayment penalties would be reintroduced into residential loan
documents in response to the needs of the secondary mortgage market, and the de-
mands of the holders of securities collateralized by mortgages, for greater predictability
of loan prepayment. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 328-34. Thus far, however, the
interests of consumerism seem to have prevailed over the needs of mortgage investors,
and his prediction has not come to pass.
It should be noted that while residential lenders rarely impose prepayment restric-
tions or fees, they in effect compensate themselves for the risk of prepayment by charg-
ing "discount points" when residential loans are originated. For example, if one
"discount point" (one percent of the amount of the loan) is charged on a loan with a
face amount of $100,000, the lender will in fact disburse only $99,000 to the borrower.
Nevertheless, if the borrower elects to prepay the loan before any amortization of the
principal has occurred, the amount necessary to prepay is the $100,000 face amount.
Thus the "points" have two effects: they increase the effective interest yield to the
lender, and they produce additional revenue to the lender if prepayment occurs. See
John M. Harris, Jr. & G. Stacy Sirmans, Discount Points, Effective Yields, and Mortgage
Prepayments, 2 J. REAL EST. RES., Winter 1987, at 97.
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purchase-money mortgages) may still employ prepayment restric-
tions, the focus of the remaining analysis here is on commercial or
income-property lending.' 8
C. An Introduction to the Law of Prepayment
A summary of the traditional rules of mortgage prepayment
will provide a helpful starting point. First, American law has pre-
sumed that in the absence of a clause permitting prepayment, the
lender is under no duty to accept it.19 Hence, a mortgage loan
whose documents are entirely silent on the subject is not prepayable
as a matter of right. This standard doctrine seems contrary to com-
mon expectation, and several courts have recently announced that
18. A very limited form of prepayment fee is currently charged by lenders on FHA
mortgage loans insured after August 2, 1985. On these loans the lender may charge
interest for the entire month during which prepayment is made, even if the prepayment
occurs before the last day of the month. In effect, borrowers who prepay before the last
day of the month thus pay an unearned partial month's interest. The amounts involved
are often several hundred dollars. See Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990 § 329, 12 U.S.C. § 4101 (Supp. III 1991) (requiring that borrower be given
notice of this practice); 56 Fed. Reg. 18,951 (1991) (HUD regulation implementing this
act); Carollo v. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 538 N.E.2d 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(upholding the practice). Note that no language authorizing this practice appears in the
standard FNMA/FHLMC residential conventional mortgage form, and a lender's at-
tempt to charge more than a per diem interest under that form is probably improper.
19. This rule of "perfect tender in time" is usually dated from Abbe v. Goodwin, 7
Conn. 377 (1829) and Brown v. Cole, 60 Eng. Rep. 424 (Ch. 1845). Professor Frank
Alexander has argued vigorously and cogently that these decisions misunderstood pre-
existing law and reached a result contrary to common sense. See Alexander, supra note
1, at 298-308.
More recent decisions applying the "perfect tender in time" rule include Dugan v.
Grzybowski, 332 A.2d 97 (Conn. 1973); MacIntyre v. Hark, 528 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (under common law rule, prepayment must be accepted only if the
borrower pays all principal and interest which would accrue during full loan term);
Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 597 A.2d 1377
(Md. 1991); Peter Fuller Enter. v. Manchester Say. Bank, 152 A.2d 179 (N.H. 1959);
Arthur v. Burkich, 520 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 1987); Beth-June, Inc. v. Wil-Avon
Merchandise Mart, Inc., 233 A.2d 620 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967); see NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 1, § 6.1 n.2; Alexander, supra note 1, at 309 nn.113-14.
Language that obligates the lender to accept prepayment does not necessarily use
the term "prepayment." For example, if the promissory note or bond's statement of the
amount of regular installments due describes that sum as "$X or more," the latter
phrase is sufficient to authorize the payment of any amount "more," including the full
balance. Similarly, a promise to pay a sum "on or before" a maturity date will permit
free payment prior to that date. See Garner v. Sisson Properties, 31 S.E.2d 400 (Ga.
1944).
For a discussion of the few cases which depart from the rule of "perfect tender in
time" and permit prepayment when the mortgage is silent on the point, see infra notes
43-49 and accompanying text.
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they will no longer follow it.20 Without doubt the standard rule
ought to be reversed. Surely it is not too much to expect lenders
who want to restrict prepayment to say so in the mortgage. But the
issue is currently of little consequence, since most modem mortgage
forms (and virtually all forms prepared for use in income-property
lending) deal explicitly with prepayments.
A second issue is the enforceability of prepayment fees which
are provided for in the relevant note or mortgage. The general reac-
tion of state courts has been to enforce them routinely, notwith-
standing arguments that they are usurious, 21 are unconscionable, 22
constitute restraints on alienation, 23 or amount to invalid liquidated
damages clauses. 24 While some case authority indicates that grossly
excessive fees might not be permitted, 25 one court approved a fee of
fifty percent of the balance being prepaid where there was some evi-
dence that the payment could have caused the lender damages ap-
proximating that amount. 26  Where the borrower is in
bankruptcy, 27 or where the prepayment is regarded as involun-
tary, 28 a very different picture, one much less favorable to lenders,
20. See Spillman v. Spillman, 509 So. 2d 442 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Hatcher v. Rose,
407 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 1991); Mahoney v. Furches, 468 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1983); see also
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.06 (West 1988) ("Any note which is silent as to the right of the
obligor to prepay the note in advance of the stated maturity date may be prepaid in full
by the obligor or his successor in interest without penalty."); MacIntyre v. Hark, 528
So. 2d 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
21. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Minassian, 777 F. Supp. 385, 390 n.1 (D.N.J. 1991)
(New Jersey law); Williams v. Fassler, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Ct. App. 1980); Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Boyd v.
Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But see In re
Abramoff, 92 B.R. 698 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (finding a prepayment fee usurious
where it was collected incident to an acceleration for default).
22. See Aronoff v. Western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 470 P.2d 889 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970).
23. See Eyde Bros. Dev. Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 697 F. Supp. 1431
(W.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1989); Sacramento Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1982); Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San
Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Ct. App. 1971).
24. See Meyers v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 113 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Ct. App. 1974);
Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 417. But see infra text accompanying notes 92-95
(arguing that such decisions are incorrect and that the prepayment fee clause is a species
of liquidated damage clause).
25. See Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
26. See Williams v. Fassler, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Ct. App. 1980); see also Century
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Madorsky, 353 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (ap-
proving a fee equal to 12 months' interest).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 98-137.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 138-189.
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emerges. But in the absence of these two factors, legal attacks by
borrowers nearly always fail.
D. The Financial Impact of Prepayment on Mortgage Lenders
From the lender's viewpoint, what function do prepayment re-
strictions and fees serve? Both lender and borrower recognize at the
time of contracting that in the event the borrower pays the loan
prior to maturity, the lender may suffer damage as a consequence.
The predominant element of that damage is, of course, the lender's
loss of an advantageous interest rate in a market in which rates may
have declined since the loan was made. The lender may also incur
some transaction cost in relending the funds, and in some cases an
additional tax liability.
Prepayment raises the possibility of gain as well as loss to the
lender. If the prepayment occurs at a time when market rates have
risen, the lender will be able to relend the funds more profitably
than under the old loan and will experience a gain. However, vol-
untary prepayments under such circumstances are relatively un-
common, since from the borrower's viewpoint a prepayment "at
par" (that is, for the face amount of the loan's balance rather than
at a discount) on these facts simply throws away the benefit of an
advantageous contract. 29 Still, such prepayments do occur some-
times. If the property is being sold, for example, the new owner
may prefer a different monthly payment structure, perhaps with
lower payments, even at the same interest rate. The mortgage may
contain nonfinancial covenants from which the new owner wishes to
escape, such as those dealing with the business operation of the
property. Individuals who guaranteed the original loan may wish
to get out of their liability. Any of these factors and others30 may
induce the mortgagor to seek repayment of the loan even if no inter-
29. Of course, the lender may negotiate with a borrower a prepayment at a dis-
count under these circumstances. If the discount is deep enough it may benefit the
borrower sufficiently to equal the present value of the low interest rate on the loan being
prepaid. For example, during 1986 and 1987 several federal government agencies that
operate loan programs began accepting prepayments from the borrowers, in some cases
at substantial discounts. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BORROWER LOAN PRE-
PAYMENTS: OMB GUIDELINES NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED 19-29 (1989) (criticizing
the basis on which some of the agencies computed discounted prepayment amounts as
too generous to borrowers and as resulting in unnecessary losses to the government).
30. The borrower may sell the real estate to a corporation which has large quanti-
ties of cash or equity financing available to it, and which for accounting purposes wishes
to hold the property debt-free; or the borrower may die, and his or her personal repre-
sentative may be under a legal obligation to pay the decedent's debts. The debt may
also be reduced by payment to the lender of the proceeds of casualty insurance policies
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est rate savings will result. But whatever the borrower's motivation
for prepaying, the payment raises a risk of damage to the lender
primarily because of the risk that the funds must be relent at a
lower interest rate.
An illustration using specific amounts will show how the
lender's damage can be quantified. Assume that a mortgage loan
has a remaining term of ten years, an interest rate of twelve percent,
and an outstanding balance of $1 million. (The original loan may
have been at a higher balance and for a longer term, but the forego-
ing assumptions reflect the loan's status at the time it is prepaid.) 31
Assume also that the loan requires equal monthly payments which
are sufficient to fully amortize the balance over the remaining term.
Those payments will be $14,347 per month.
Now suppose a complete prepayment of the loan is made at a
time when current mortgage interest rates (on similar types of
loans) have fallen to ten percent. If we disregard transaction costs
and assume that the lender in fact relends the $1 million at ten per-
cent interest for a ten year term, the lender will receive a monthly
payment of $13,215 per month; the loss in monthly payments to the
lender as a result of the prepayment and relending will thus be
$14,347 minus $13,215, or $1,132 per month. The present value of
this monthly loss, discounted at the current interest rate of ten per-
cent, is $85,736.32
Some further elements of damage to the lender may exist. The
borrower generally pays virtually all out-of-pocket transaction costs
in commercial loan transactions: title, survey, credit report, ap-
praisal, inspection, and other fees. In addition, lenders typically
charge a general "loan fee" or "origination fee," which may cover
part or all of their internal costs. But to the extent that any costs of
relending are not thus covered, the lender may have a legitimate
claim of further damage. Of course, the lender would eventually
have incurred relending costs even if the loan had been paid on
schedule rather than prior to maturity. Hence, it would be reason-
able to "amortize" the relending costs, reducing the lender's claim
or eminent domain takings, or may be accelerated by the lender because of the bor-
rower's default or the transfer of the property. See discussion infra notes 138-189.
31. For example, the loan might have been made five years earlier for a total term
of 15 years. Under this assumption, the original loan amount would have been
$1,195,500 and the balance would have been reduced to $1 million by five years of
regular monthly payments. This information is not essential to the illustration in the
text.
32. The current mortgage rate is an appropriate discount rate, since it reflects the
current value of money in the relevant market.
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of damages over time as prepayment occurs later in the original
loan's term.
Moreover, the lender may be required to wait for some period
until another suitable mortgage lending opportunity presents itself.
Of course, the lender will not hide the money in a mattress in the
interim; it will be invested in short-term commercial paper, short-
maturity United States government obligations, or similar cash-
equivalent instruments. These investments will typically carry in-
terest rates a bit lower than commercial mortgage rates-perhaps
two to three percent lower. 33 Hence there may be an additional
short-term loss beyond that estimated above. But its impact is apt
to be quite small; the loss of even three percent interest on a $1
million principal sum for a month is only about $2,500. In general,
then, the estimate of the lender's damages presented above must be
regarded as both easy to derive and accurate.
A prepayment also raises the possibility of greater income tax
liability to the lender, at least if the lender is also the seller of the
real estate and is reporting the gain from that sale on the install-
ment basis. 34 Prepayment may accelerate to the current year a tax
liability that would have accrued only in future years under the
original payment schedule. Consequently, the seller/lender may
suffer economically both from having to pay the taxes earlier and
possibly from having to pay them at a higher marginal rate.
The borrower and lender have the right to allocate the risk of
the lender's loss of an advantageous rate in any way they choose.
One possibility, represented by the FNMA/FHLMC home mort-
gage form, is free prepayment: the lender bears the entire risk of
interest rate declines. At the other extreme, the agreement may
provide that the loan is "locked in," so that prepayment is not per-
missible; thus the borrower bears the full risk. One may also imag-
33. See, e.g., Loan Demand Weak, While Interest Rates Inch Up, REAL EsT. FIN.
TODAY, Apr. 26, 1989, at 14 (reporting income-property mortgage yields of about
100-105 basis points (a basis point is 1/100 of 1%) above U.S. Treasury obligations of
similar maturity (e.g., 5 to 10 years), but with larger spreads of 125-150 basis points on
smaller loans below $5 million).
Relating these rates to those on short-term (e.g., 90-day) Treasury yields is more
complex, since short-term yields are "normally" significantly below medium-term yields
(e.g., 150-200 basis points lower), but sometimes rise to or above medium-term yields
during periods in which investors expect rates to rise generally. This phenomenon is
known as an inversion of the "yield curve."
The statement in the text is thus a reasonable estimate of the typical differential
between income-property mortgage rates and short-term Treasury rates, but that differ-
ential is quite variable.
34. I.R.C. § 453 (Supp. 11 1990).
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ine any number of possible arrangements permitting partial
prepayment, or full prepayment with various sorts of fee structures,
and thus accomplishing a sharing of risk between borrower and
lender.
II. LOCKED-IN MORTGAGE LOANS
A. The Economics of Mortgage Lock-Ins
Loans on commercial real estate commonly contain clauses
known as "lock-ins" which prohibit all prepayments for the first
five to ten years of the loan term. These clauses are designed to
protect the lender's investment in situations in which market rates
have fallen at the time of a proposed prepayment; if rates have risen
instead, the lender will normally be eager to waive the prohibition
and accept the prepayment. Even if rates have fallen, so that the
prepayment will produce loss to the lender, the lender may well be
amenable to accepting prepayment during this period but may ne-
gotiate a sizeable fee as the price of doing so.35 As the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, upholding the results of such a negotiation,
stated: "Having a good investment that did not require acceptance
of prepayment, [the lender] could use market tactics to exact a
profit." '36
As noted above, in the absence of mortgage language on the
point, the common law presumed that the lender had no obligation
to accept prepayment. 37 A fortiori, when the documents expressly
prohibit early payment, the courts usually enforce these lock-in
clauses, sustaining the lender's right to refuse all prepayments for
the period specified.38 This result is surprising, and wholly out of
35. See, e.g., Houston N. Hosp. Properties v. Telco Leasing, Inc., 680 F.2d 19,
22-23 (5th Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 688 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1982); Tyler v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 512 So. 2d 55 (Ala. 1987). In each of the cases cited infra in note 52, the
lender indicated a willingness to negotiate a fee which would permit prepayment during
the lock-in period.
36. Houston N. Hosp. Properties, 680 F.2d at 22-23.
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Several states have enacted statutes
in recent years granting a right to prepay, but they are usually limited to mortgages on
owner-occupied homes. See, e.g., 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101, 405 (1992); see also
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 6.1 n.3.
38. Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568-70 (9th Cir.
1988) (clause enforceable unless extrinsic evidence shows it to be contrary to the parties'
intent); Riveredge Assocs. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 892, 896 (D.N.J.
1991) (borrower cannot, by defaulting, force lender to accelerate loan and accept pre-
payment); Clover Square Assocs. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp.
1137, 1139 (D.N.J. 1987) (lock-in clause is not an invalid restraint on alienation); Tyler
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 512 So. 2d 55, 57 (Ala. 1987) (lender may properly exact
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character with general contract law. A prepayment is in essence a
breach by the borrower of the loan contract, requiring the borrower
to repay the loan funds only in accordance with a prearranged
schedule. In general it is unusual for the courts to compel a con-
tracting party actually to perform; this result usually occurs only in
cases in which the performance is unique or cannot fairly be com-
pensated by money damages.39 In all other cases a contracting
party is regarded as having the choice to perform or to pay damages
for the breach. Since the payment of a mortgage loan as agreed
(rather than via prepayment) is obviously not a unique sort of per-
formance, and since its failure can easily be compensated by money
damages, it is not clear why courts have been willing to enforce
lock-in clauses literally.
Economic theory argues strongly for nonenforcement of the
lock-in clause. The basis of this argument is the concept of the effi-
cient breach. As Professor Hirsch has explained, this concept holds
that:
[I]f one party determines that breach is in its self-interest, actual
breach is efficient, as long as the other party is not harmed. The
rule of financial [sic] equivalent performance ensures such an
outcome by giving the nonbreacher the value of his deal; it re-
leases the breaching party from an actual performance that he
believes would be more expensive for him than payment of dam-
ages. Thus, the party best able to evaluate the cost of actual per-
formance versus the payment of financial equivalent damages is
given the power to decide. The nonbreacher is given his full fi-
nancial equivalent for performance of the deal and may purchase
conforming performance on the market. 0
The case of mortgage prepayment is an ideal one for applica-
tion of this concept. The lender who receives an unwanted prepay-
a fee in return for its consent to payment of locked-in loan); Gutzi Assocs. v. Switzer,
264 Cal. Rptr. 538, 542 (Ct. App. 1989) (same); McCae Management Corp. v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 553 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (when
loan is locked-in, lender may negotiate for prepayment fee); Arthur v. Burkich, 520
N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (App. Div. 1987) (same); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 583 P.2d
1126, 1128 (Or. 1978) (same).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359-60 (1979) (specific per-
formance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages are an adequate remedy; ade-
quacy of damages is decided with reference to the difficulty of proof, the difficulty of
purchasing a suitable substitute performance, and the likelihood of collecting damages if
awarded).
40. WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 142 (2d ed. 1988); see also James
P. Fenton, Note, Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie Evidence, 51 IND. L.J. 189,
190-92 (1975); Note, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages, 72 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1055, 1077 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Economic Analysis].
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ment, but who is also given the full economic value of the damages
caused by the prepayment, simply has nothing to complain about;
the lender may proceed to relend the funds, perhaps at a lower rate,
but will have been fully compensated for the loss of income. The
borrower who wishes to prepay, and who concludes that prepay-
ment will be advantageous even though he or she must pay full
damages as well, should be permitted to do so. If the borrower's
calculation of advantage is correct (and nobody is in a better posi-
tion to judge it), an efficient result will ensue, and society as a whole
will be better off.
Of course, in most cases the borrower will experience no direct
economic advantage from prepayment under a legal rule that re-
quires payment of full damages. In general, the borrower may refi-
nance at a lower rate of interest and save considerable money over
time, but the damages that must be paid to the old lender as the
price of the prepayment will precisely equal the present value of
those savings.41 Further, if the borrower plans to refinance by ob-
taining another conventional mortgage loan, he or she will usually
incur significant transaction costs (title, legal, recording, appraisal,
and similar expenses) in originating that new loan; hence, the pros-
pect of refinancing and paying the old lender's full damages be-
comes unattractive.
But for some borrowers in unusual situations, prepayment ac-
companied by the payment of actual damages may be advantageous.
Several illustrations can be suggested. One possibility is a tempo-
rary market disequilibrium, allowing the borrower to find conven-
tional financing elsewhere at lower rates than the existing lender
can demand. But the financial markets of the United States have
developed to a point of very high efficiency, and such a differential
in rates is unlikely to be appreciable in size or to exist for long.
The following more probable situations offer examples in
which prepayment is advantageous despite the borrower's obliga-
tion to pay damages: (1) the real estate is being acquired by a gov-
ernmental body or other entity that is cash rich or has access to
below-market funds through tax-exempt borrowing; (2) the bor-
41. This point is nicely illustrated in John Tung, The Cost of the Loan Prepayment
Privilege, REAL EST. REV., Spring 1989, at 87, 88-90. The borrower may obtain some
forms of indirect advantages by refinancing, even if the lender's full damages must be
paid. For example, the new financing may have a longer term and lower monthly pay-
ments than the old loan, and thus may be easier to cover with the project's cash flow. If
the transaction cost of refinancing is not too great, it may be worthwhile to the
borrower.
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rower has qualified for financing through industrial development
bonds, state housing finance agency bonds, or other state or local
governmental debt, again at a below-market, tax-exempt interest
rate; (3) the borrower has been awarded a governmental loan guar-
antee which enhances his or her credit substantially, allowing the
borrowing of conventional funds at lower rates than would nor-
mally be available; or (4) the borrower "goes public" or proposes to
sell the real estate to a public corporation that can raise funds in the
bond or equity markets with great economies of scale and, hence, at
a lower rate than would prevail in the mortgage market.
In each of these cases, the borrower either no longer needs debt
financing or can procure it advantageously from other sources.
Whether, in the case of tax-exempt financing, the borrowing vehicle
is itself efficient in a macroeconomic sense is another question and
well beyond the scope of the present discussion,42 but from the
viewpoint of the law of mortgage prepayments, it seems indisputa-
ble that the proposed prepayment (or breach) should be permitted if
the borrower will pay full damages.
B. Locked-In Mortgages in the Courts
A few courts in recent years appear to have come around to
this view. Perhaps the best illustration is the opinion of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Mahoney v. Furches.43 In Mahoney the
court created a presumption under Pennsylvania law contrary to
the common law presumption: that a right to prepayment exists if
the note is silent as to that right.
Of greater significance, however, was the court's discussion of
an offer that the borrower had made to give the lender a bank letter
of credit or guarantee of payment in return for the lender's release
of the land as security for the loan. The court observed in dictum
that
even where the mortgage explicitly states there is no right to pre-
pay the note, if the mortgagor can provide the mortgagee with
the benefit of his bargain under the terms of the note, he will be
allowed to have a release of his land following the substitution of
security or other arrangement. 44
42. See generally David C. Beck, Rethinking Tax-Exempt Financing for State and
Local Governments, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1982, at 30; Dennis
Zimmerman, The Intergovernmental Struggle over Tax-Exempt Bond Reform, in 7 RE-
SEARCH IN URBAN ECONOMICS 101 (Michael E. Bell ed., 1988).
43. 468 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1983); see also Spillman v. Spillman, 509 So. 2d 442, 444
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Skyles v. Burge, 789 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
44. Mahoney, 468 A.2d at 461 n.1.
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The borrower can often provide this sort of substituted security,45
and Professor Frank Alexander has argued forcefully that the Penn-
sylvania court was correct in suggesting that the lender should be
required to accept it as a matter of law. 46 Economic analysis of
such transactions justifies the court's result. A substitution typi-
cally provides the lender with a better deal than it originally struck.
The cash flow it receives will be identical to that agreed in the un-
derlying mortgage note, yet the lender has obtained greater
security.47
Nevertheless, a substitution of security should not be the bor-
rower's only choice. The Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion in
the Mahoney case suggests a broader view. That court declared
that it would violate public policy "if we were to preclude the satis-
faction of this mortgage once the mortgagor has provided for a
method of prepayment that enables the mortgagee to reap all the
benefits of the bargain including, of course, insulation of the mort-
gagee from such adverse tax consequences as may follow the pre-
payment."'48 Under this expansive statement, the "benefit of the
bargain" owed to the lender might quite conceivably take the form,
not of a substitution of security, but of a cash payment of the
lender's damages. Of course, the substitution of security approach
has the advantage of circumventing the need to measure damages,
since the lender literally suffers none. Nonetheless, if the borrower
is willing to pay actual damages, there is authority (albeit dictum)
in the superior court's opinion in the Mahoney case for a right to do
SO.
45. An approach even less objectionable to the lender can sometimes be worked
out. See Harris Ominsky, Creative Financing: How to Refinance Your Property in the
Face of Lock-In Devices, A.B.A. REAL EST. FIN. NEWSL., Feb. 15, 1989, at 19, 22.
Ominsky describes a technique in which the borrower places on deposit with a title
insurer a sum of money equal to the balance on the existing mortgage. The borrower
then obtains a new mortgage loan (at a lower interest rate) which the title company is
willing to insure as a first lien since the company has the funds on deposit to fully pay
off the prior lien. The title company invests these funds in accordance with standards
agreed to by the borrower, and uses the investment earnings to service the preexisting
loan. Id. Of course, if the investment earnings are not sufficient to cover the full debt
service, the borrower will have to supplement the difference.
46. Alexander, supra note 1, at 337 n.240.
47. Obviously the lender is entitled to quibble if the financial strength of the institu-
tion issuing the guarantee or letter of credit is not at least the reasonable equivalent of
the real estate security being released. But if the institution issuing the letter of credit is
strong, "[t]he lender will usually go along with this. It can then continue to collect the
contracted interest rates, and the credit enhancement will give it almost a bonded loan
at no extra cost." Ominsky, supra note 45, at 22.
48. 454 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct.), rev'd, 468 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1983).
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The rationale of the superior court's Mahoney decision (as well
as that of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court) did not rely on the pre-
viously mentioned policy favoring efficient breach. Rather, the
courts' opinions were based on the view that prohibitions on pre-
payment unreasonably restrain the alienation of land. In most
cases, however, this rationale is doubtful. Where a prepayment pro-
hibition is present, the purchaser of the land may assume or take
subject to the mortgage. If the mortgage loan carries an above-mar-
ket rate, the purchaser of the land will insist on a discount against
the purchase price to compensate him or her for taking over such
disadvantageous financing. But this is merely another way of say-
ing that the market value of the seller's financing has declined as a
result of falling market interest rates. The discount the seller must
absorb (if the market in land is perfectly efficient) will be the
equivalent of the damages which would be owed to the lender if the
loan were prepaid. In reality, alienation is not restrained at all; the
seller is merely haggling about the price. The same is usually true
of the other terms included in the mortgage-term, outstanding bal-
ance, payment schedule, and need for additional collateral. These
terms may not be ideal to the purchaser, but at some price-point,
they will be acceptable.
On the precise facts of the Mahoney case, however, one can
make a persuasive argument that the lender's refusal to accept pre-
payment or substituted security caused an actual restraint on aliena-
tion. In Mahoney, the borrower proposed to sell the land as a
subdivision rather than as a single tract. While there is no legal
objection to the lot purchasers taking their titles subject to the pre-
existing "blanket" mortgage on the entire subdivision, there are se-
rious practical problems with such an arrangement. In principle, it
is possible to allocate payments on the blanket mortgage loan
among the various lot buyers. The difficulties stem from the (rea-
sonable) unwillingness of a given lot buyer to depend on the other
owners making their prorata payments on the underlying mortgage.
The situation requires undue and unacceptable mutual dependency:
if Buyer 1 makes the required pro rata payments on the mortgage
but Buyer 2 does not, Buyer 1 is subject to the risk of losing his or
her land to foreclosure. 49 Hence, to subdivide the land successfully
49. The doctrine of marshaling of assets might provide some purchasers consola-
tion in this situation, requiring that the seller's retained land be foreclosed first, and that
the lots sold then be foreclosed in the inverse order of their sale. This might make the
earlier lot buyers feel relatively secure, but the later buyers would face an increasingly
unacceptable level of risk. Moreover, marshaling is a concept fraught with uncertainty
[Vol. 40:851
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it is probably essential that the seller procure its release from the
mortgage first.
Outside the subdivision context, however, it is most doubtful
that prepayment prohibitions per se restrain the marketing of real
estate. Occasionally, there may be a purchaser whose preference for
alternate financing is so strong that the inability to pay off the ex-
isting mortgage interferes with a sale. For example, a corporate
buyer may, for accounting reasons, prefer to fund its purchase of
the land with equity financing rather than mortgage debt. This is,
however, an unusual situation.
In most cases, the lock-in provision of the existing mortgage
does not kill sales. Rather, it reduces the seller's revenue upon sale
as a result of the seller's having agreed to an interest rate that turns
out to be high by the standards of the market at the time the sale of
the land occurs. This is the very risk that the seller assumed by
entering into a long-term, nonprepayable loan, and it can hardly be
considered to restrain alienation. Thus, the restraint on alienation
doctrine usually provides at best a weak rationale for a court's re-
fusal to enforce a lock-in clause literally. The principle of efficient
breach, presented above, has far broader application and is thus
more appealing. For that reason, rather than the reason which the
court gave, the Mahoney result is correct. The common law pre-
sumption that mortgage loans are nonprepayable should be re-
versed, and it should be legally impossible to "lock in" a mortgage
loan.
Ill. ENFORCEMENT OF PREPAYMENT FEES OUTSIDE
BANKRUPTCY
A. A Taxonomy of Prepayment Fee Clauses
We turn now from the lock-in problem to a consideration of
prepayment fees. To begin, an examination of the kinds of fees in
common use in the United States in recent decades is useful. The
material which follows is not based on any broad-gauge survey of
lenders or borrowers. Rather, it is anecdotal in nature, derived
from reading the cases, examining numerous forms, and discussing
the matter with lenders. Nevertheless, I believe it accurately de-
picts the evolution of the prepayment fee clause in modern
mortgages.
and highly subject to litigation; few land buyers would wish to rely on it. See generally
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 10.10.
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We may begin with a clause that we will call Type I. In es-
sence, it is a clause fixing a flat fee, either in dollar terms or as a
percentage of the loan balance, as the price of prepayment. The
prototype of this clause was found in the original FNMA/FHLMC
home mortgage form, developed in 1971. It permitted the borrower
to prepay up to twenty percent of the original balance in any twelve
month period without charge, and levied a fee of six months' inter-
est on all prepayments in excess of the twenty percent level. For a
time this formula was enshrined in the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board's regulations governing federal savings and loan associa-
tions,3 0 and it has been cited by at least one court as prima facie
reasonable. 5
Over the last decade, commercial mortgage documents have
used a different sort of clause, termed here Type II. The Type II
clause permits prepayment if the borrower also pays an accompany-
ing fee, defined as a declining percentage of the loan balance over
time. Often this sort of clause will also "lock in" the loan, prohibit-
50. The regulation provided:
A borrower on a loan secured by a home or a combination of home or
business property may prepay the loan without penalty unless the loan
contract expressly provides for a prepayment penalty. The prepayment
penalty for a loan secured by [an owner-occupied home] shall not be
more than 6 months' advance interest on that part of the aggregate
amount of all prepayments made on such loan in any 12 month period
which exceeds 20 percent of the original principal amount of the loan.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-5(b) (1981).
A similar regulation was adopted by the Board in 31 Fed. Reg. 7508 (1966), and
was codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12 (all editions of the C.F.R. through 1979). That
regulation was repealed by 45 Fed. Reg. 76,102 (1980) after the adoption of § 545.8-5 in
44 Fed. Reg. 39, 108 (1979). Section 545.8-5 was repealed by the Board in 1983. See 48
Fed. Reg. 23,032, 23,063 (1983). The present regulation, adopted in 1983, merely states
that "[an] association may impose a penalty on prepayment of a loan as provided in the
loan contract." 12 C.F.R. § 545.34 (1992). The principal purpose of this statement is
to preempt conflicting state law for the benefit of federally-chartered savings institu-
tions. See Pacific Trust Co. TTEE v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 229 Cal. Rptr.
269, 272-73 (Ct. App. 1986); Toolan v. Trevose Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 462 A.2d 224,
226-27 (Pa. 1983); see also Collins v. Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610, 618
(Nev. 1983) (state limitations on late fees preempted by FHLBB regulation).
51. The clause involved in Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418 (Ct. App. 1971), read as follows:
Privilege is reserved to make additional payments on the principal of this
indebtedness at any time without penalty, except that as to any such pay-
ments made which exceed twenty percentum (20%) of the original princi-
pal amount of this loan during any successive twelve (12) month period
beginning with the date of this promissory note, the undersigned agrees
to pay, as consideration for the acceptance of such prepayment, six (6)
months advance interest on that part of the aggregate amount of all pre-
payments in excess of such twenty percentum (20%).
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ing all prepayment for a limited period, such as the first five years,
seven years, or ten years of the loan's life. For example, the loan
might be "locked in" for ten years, a prepayment fee of five percent
might be imposed during year eleven, four percent during year
twelve, and so on, with a one percent fee payable in year fifteen and
thereafter.52 This clause is similar to the Type I clause described
above. Only the lock-in period and the fact that the fee declines
much more rapidly over time once the lock-in period has expired
distinguish the two clauses.
A third type of clause has come into common use since the
early 1980s. Rather than computing the fee as a predefined percent-
age of the balance being prepaid, the Type III clause attempts to
measure, or at least to approximate, the lender's actual damage
flowing from the prepayment. Because they seem designed to give
the lender the economic equivalent of the yield it would have earned
if the loan had remained in place for its full term, these clauses are
sometimes referred to as "yield maintenance" clauses. To accom-
plish this, Type III clauses must take into account market interest
rates at the time of prepayment. Such clauses can become complex,
but a rudimentary version might fix the fee as the difference be-
tween the loan interest rate and the then-current yield on U.S.
Treasury notes closest in maturity to the remaining loan term, mul-
tiplied by the loan balance and then by the number of years remain-
ing on the loan term. 53 As we shall see, the accuracy of this method
of measuring the lender's loss may be open to serious criticism; but
it does approximate that loss, at least in rough terms.
B. The Economics of Prepayment Fees
Essentially, prepayment fees are nothing more than liquidated
damages clauses. The lender has committed itself to leave its funds
outstanding for a fixed period at a given interest yield, and to suffer
the market rate risk inherent in this position. If rates rise after the
loan has been made, the value of the loan to the lender will fall
accordingly. This risk is inherent in the role of a fixed-interest
lender, and it is only partially mitigated by the inclusion of a due-
on-sale clause. In return for absorbing the risk of rising rates, the
52. For examples of this sort of schedule, see Eyde Bros. Dev. Co. v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 697 F. Supp. 1431, 1432 n.I (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 127 (6th
Cir. 1989); Abramoff v. Life Ins. Co., 92 B.R. 698, 699 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); Rod-
gers v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 757 P.2d 976, 977 (Wash. 1988); McCausland v. Bankers
Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 941, 942 (Wash. 1988).
53. See In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1000 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
1993]
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 871 1992-1993
UCLA LAW REVIEW
lender wants "call protection": some assurance that if market rates
fall, the borrower will not merely prepay the loan and refinance at a
lower rate.54 From the lender's viewpoint, a prepayment is a dero-
gation of the right to earn the agreed yield for the full term even if
extrinsic rates drop. In other words, the borrower breaches its obli-
gation to keep the loan in effect for its full term.
If the lender demands (and has the bargaining power to insist)
that the borrower absorb the risk of loss that results from falling
interest rates, the borrower may seek to limit its exposure. Under
these circumstances it is plausible for the lender to offer to insure
the borrower, agreeing for a fee to limit the borrower's exposure in
the event of a severe drop in interest rates. This is the effect of a
Type I or Type II prepayment fee: the lender stipulates that the fee
will be deemed to cover the lender's loss, whether the actual loss
turns out to be greater or smaller.
The highly volatile nature of interest rates in recent years em-
phasizes the plausibility of this sort of insuring arrangement. At the
time of contracting, the amount or even the existence of the loss
that may eventuate from prepayment is virtually impossible to esti-
mate. Even the most venturesome prognosticator is unlikely to
make guesses about interest rates more than a year or so into the
future. Their behavior seems essentially random over more than a
very short period, and trends are easy to spot only after they have
run their course. For example, the thirteen percent rates that mort-
gage lenders were demanding in 1980 seemed unprecedented and
might have been viewed as the peak of the cycle until they were
eclipsed by the fifteen percent rates of 1981. 55 Similarly, an eight
percent rate may appear relatively low unless rates a few years later
fall to five percent. It is reasonable to expect borrowers to be less
inclined than institutional lenders to attempt to manage this sort of
risk. Most institutional lenders are in the mortgage market more or
less continuously, while most borrowers, even if they own large in-
come-producing projects, enter the market only at infrequent inter-
54. See First Nat'l Bank v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, No. 87-2829, 1989 WL 79789
(E.D. Pa. July 10, 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1990), in which the borrower was
given an explicit choice of an adjustable rate mortgage or a fixed rate with a large pre-
payment fee.
55. The average contract interest rate on conventional mortgage loans made by
FSLIC-insured institutions on one-to-four-family homes rose steadily during 1978 and
1979, finally reaching 13.74% in May 1980. It then fell slowly for three months before
beginning another upswing which peaked in November 1981 at 15.80%. These data,
supplied by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, were reprinted in REAL EST. FIN.
TODAY, Sept. 30, 1988, at 10.
[Vol. 40:851
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 872 1992-1993
MOR TGAGE PR EPA YMENT CLA USES
vals. They probably have no special expertise in its intricacies and
no familiarity with the tools generally employed by lenders to hedge
the risks of rate fluctuations.
Like other types of liquidated damages clauses, the prepayment
fee can be viewed as a form of insurance, in this case purchased by
the borrower qua insured from the lender qua insurer.5 6 The insur-
ance "premium" is the prepayment fee itself. Unlike most forms of
conventional insurance, in which the premium is paid at the time of
the contract or on a monthly or annual basis, the "premium" here is
payable only if and when the event that gives rise to the risk of
loss-prepayment as a result of the borrower's actions-occurs. 57
The "payout" of the insurance proceeds occurs by virtue of the
lender's absorption of whatever loss results from the prepayment.
Traditional economic theory suggests that such a bargain, if
freely and knowledgeably entered into, should be sustained by the
courts. There are several reasons for this. First, the parties to the
contract are best positioned to evaluate their own aversion to risk
and to allocate it between themselves. The prepayment fee clause
permits the borrower to place a ceiling on the liability that will en-
sue from a prepayment. In effect, the fee buys certainty for the bor-
rower, and the lender is rewarded financially for absorbing the risk
of market rate fluctuation. There is plainly an economic efficiency
in permitting parties who are not equally averse to risk to shift that
risk between themselves.
The prepayment fee clause has the further advantage of elimi-
nating the need for an actual (and possibly costly) measurement of
the lender's actual damages if and when prepayment occurs. I ar-
gue in this Article that the core of the damage that lenders suffer
from prepayment-the loss of an advantageous interest rate-is
easy to measure. But the peripheral elements, such as the cost of
relending the funds and the impact on the lender's tax liability, may
be much more difficult to assess. Only after an expensive and time-
consuming trial can a jury be expected to determine these damages.
It is entirely rational for the parties to use the prepayment fee clause
as a device for avoiding such a trial. The clause also avoids the
56. See Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated
Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 152 (1984); Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Comment,
Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate Contracts: Returning to the Histor-
ical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMORY L.J. 267, 284 n.83 (1990).
57. This is an important point. It is prepayment caused by the borrower that the
parties intend to insure against. If a prepayment results from the lender's acts rather
than those of the borrower, no "insurance premium" should be due. The distinction is
critical in the analysis of so-called "involuntary" prepayments. See infra Part V.
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uncertainties of trial, such as the risk that a particular jury may be
biased against lenders or real estate entrepreneurs, causing it to
render a verdict that to some degree fails reasonably to view the
evidence before it.
The prepayment fee clause enables the borrower to decide
whether breach (in the form of prepayment) is efficient.5" I have
argued above that a breach by the borrower is efficient if it saves the
borrower more than the lender's full damages.59 But if the bor-
rower is uncertain about the amount of damages that he or she must
pay, and if that amount can be determined only by litigation, the
decision to breach by prepaying is difficult to make and the bor-
rower may not make it accurately. The inaccuracy may be great
enough to produce economic inefficiency if, for example, the bor-
rower refrains from prepaying the loan because he or she believes
the resulting liability would exceed the benefits of refinancing, when
in fact the liability would be less than that amount.
Of course, it is possible that in a particular transaction the in-
surance premium to which the borrower agrees (in the form of a
prepayment fee) may either exceed or be exceeded by the actual
loss. A borrower who agrees to a large fee, and who then prepays
the loan when rates have fallen only slightly or not at all, may feel
that she or he has overpaid. This attitude is perhaps human nature,
like that of an automobile driver who pays collision insurance pre-
miums for thirty years and makes a claim only once for a minor
fender-bender. But if the contract was freely and knowledgeably
made, it must be regarded as efficient and should be upheld, absent
some persuasive countervailing argument. 60 The borrower received
58. See James A. Weisfield, Note, "Keep the Changel": A Critique of the No Actual
Injury Defense to Liquidated Damages, 65 WASH. L. REV. 977, 990-91 (1990). It can
be argued that liquidated damages clauses which produce awards in excess of actual
damages may introduce inefficiencies, since a contracting party who might breach and
pay actual damages might not be willing to breach and pay the higher liquidated sum.
See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (Pos-
ner, J.). But it seems more probable that the party with the opportunity to engage in an
efficient breach will do so, after renegotiating the damages clause with the other party to
share the financial benefits of the breach with him or her. See Debora L. Threedy,
Liquidated and Limited Damages and the Revision of Article 2: An Opportunity to Re-
think the UC.C. 's Treatment of Agreed Remedies, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 427, 447-48 nn.
93-95 (1990).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
60. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 293-96
(1988); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & ECONOMICS 61-63
(1983); Weisfield, supra note 58, at 978-80. Indeed, Richard Posner has remarked that
the courts' reluctance to enforce agreed damages clauses is "a major unexplained puzzle
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the certainty that the fee provided, and for which the borrower had
bargained.
To pursue further the efficiency implications of prepayment
fees, let us return to the numerical example of the lender's loss from
prepayment presented earlier in this Article.61 We saw there that
when the borrower prepaid a $1 million loan with a ten-year re-
maining term and a twelve percent interest rate and when prevailing
mortgage rates were ten percent at the time of prepayment, the
lender suffered damage of $85,736. This amount represented the
present value of the lender's loss in revenue resulting from the pre-
payment. Of course, this figure also represents the value to the bor-
rower of the right to prepay the loan; assuming that the borrower
can refinance the $1 million principal at ten percent (the prevailing
mortgage rate), the present value of the savings that the borrower
will experience will be precisely $85,736.
The mortgage may contain a prepayment fee clause which im-
poses a charge that is less than, equal to, or greater than the lender's
damage figure. Let us assume that the clause is legally enforceable
and consider its impact on borrower and lender behavior in each of
these three cases, all of which provide the borrower an opportunity
to refinance at current interest rates (ten percent in the illustration
above). First, suppose the fee is less than the lender's damages (and
the borrower's gain from prepayment). In such a case, if other
transaction costs are ignored, it is plainly to the borrower's advan-
tage to refinance, and we can expect him or her to do So. 6 2
If prepayment occurs in this setting, the lender obviously suf-
fers some degree of uncompensated loss. This is the risk that the
lender voluntarily assumed by agreeing to the prepayment fee
clause when the loan was originally negotiated. The effect of the
transaction is to transfer some income from the lender to the bor-
rower, but there is no obvious public policy reason for the legal
system to interfere with such a transfer. The insurance arrange-
ment between borrower and lender should be permitted to play it-
self out.
in the economic theory of the common law." Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 290 (1979).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
62. As noted already, there is a further disincentive to the borrower's prepaying
and refinancing the loan: he or she will probably have to pay quite significant transac-
tion costs-perhaps in the order of 3% to 5% of the loan amount-to procure the new
loan. Hence, refinancing is likely to occur only if the prepayment fee is lower than the
lender's damage figure by an amount somewhat greater than the transaction costs.
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The second case for consideration here is that in which the pre-
payment fee is equal to the lender's damage figure. Ordinarily, a
borrower who wished to refinance to take advantage of lower inter-
est rates but who, under applicable legal rules, could do so only by
covering the lender's actual damage would simply decide not to en-
gage in the transaction, since it would be a "wash" from the bor-
rower's viewpoint. 63 The borrower would pay the lender $85,736 in
the illustration above, and would experience a present value savings
of exactly the same amount. When we consider the transaction
costs of obtaining substitute financing, it is all the more clear that
no voluntary refinancing will occur.
In the third case, the prepayment fee is higher than the lender's
damage figure. From the discussion above, it is clear a fortiori that
the borrower will decline to refinance. It makes no difference
whether the fee is only a little higher than the lender's damages or is
astronomically higher. In this setting, the size of the fee is irrele-
vant; a rational person will be just as disdainful of the opportunity
to spend $1.10 to save $1 as to spend $2 to achieve the same savings.
Since current market interest rates establish the value of the prepay-
ment privilege, the borrower can always limit his or her loss to that
amount simply by refraining from prepaying. The irresistible impli-
cation of this argument is that, so far as voluntary prepayments are
concerned, there is no economic difference, and hence there should
be no legal difference, between prepayment fees that are merely
fully compensatory to the lender and those that are grossly over-
compensatory because no borrower is going to pay an overcompen-
satory fee.
However, occasionally a borrower may have access to refinanc-
ing at below-market interest rates. In other words, a situation may
arise in which the privilege of prepayment to the borrower has a
higher value than the amount of the lender's damages. This is a
fairly rare circumstance for owners of commercial real estate, but it
may arise in several ways, already enumerated above.64
For whatever reason, let us assume that the borrower in our
numerical example above can refinance the loan at only eight per-
cent interest despite the fact that the existing lender would be able
to relend the prepaid funds at ten percent. It is simple to calculate
the value of prepayment to the borrower in this setting. The bor-
rower's monthly payments on the new eight-percent loan for a ten-
63. See Tung, supra note 41.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
[Vol. 40:851
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 876 1992-1993
MOR TGA GE PREPA YMENT CLA USES
year term will be $12,133. Since payments on the old twelve per-
cent loan are $14,348, the borrower will save $2,215 per month by
refinancing. Discounting this savings to a present value (using the
borrower's interest rate of eight percent as a discount rate) produces
a saving to the borrower of $182,564-more than twice the lender's
damages of $85,736.
What will be the borrower's reaction to an enforceable prepay-
ment fee clause in this setting? Plainly the borrower will be willing
to refinance and suffer the prepayment fee, even though it is larger
than the lender's damages, if it is smaller than the $182,564 savings
(less the transaction cost of refinancing). But suppose the fee is
larger than that amount; indeed, suppose it is vastly larger-say,
fifty percent of the amount being prepaid, or $500,000 in our exam-
ple. On cursory examination, one might suppose that such a huge
fee will inhibit the borrower's prepayment of the loan. Thus, the
borrower will lose the opportunity to take advantage of the below-
market-rate financing.
But further analysis suggests that this is an unlikely result.
Rather, the borrower is likely to approach the lender and renegoti-
ate the fee, thus satisfying both parties' interests. Recall that we are
discussing voluntary prepayment; the borrower is under no compul-
sion, legal or economic, to refinance. We can imagine a conversa-
tion between borrower and lender along these lines:
Borrower: I've been thinking about paying off our loan. Of
course, you know very well that I have no intention of giving you
an additional half-million dollars as a prepayment fee, and if you
insist on receiving it, there simply won't be a prepayment. I esti-
mate that your actual damages from prepayment in today's inter-
est market environment will be about $85,000. I'm prepared to
offer you an additional $50,000, or a total of $135,000, as a fee.
If you accept my offer, you'll make a tidy profit. If you don't, I'll
just keep paying on the existing loan.
Lender: We may have some difference of opinion about the size
of my damages, but I must admit that your estimate is pretty
close. I want to negotiate a bit about the exact amount of the fee,
but I think we can work out a deal along the general lines you
have suggested.
This negotiation fully compensates the lender for its damages
and achieves a division between borrower and lender of the present
value of the borrower's access to below-market-rate financing. If
the $135,000 fee represents the parties' final agreement, the lender
has gained about $50,000 over and above its damages, while the
borrower has gained nearly $50,000 as well. This transaction has
transferred some income from the borrower to the lender, but this
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outcome neither produces any apparent economic inefficiency nor
violates public policy. Obviously, the borrower will never concede
to the lender any more than the borrower's total savings from the
refinancing; there would be no incentive for the borrower to do so.
Observe that the size of the contractual prepayment fee (assuming
that it is greater than the borrower's total savings less the transac-
tion costs of refinancing) is entirely irrelevant.
Will such a negotiation actually occur and will it lead to the
sort of settlement described above? The reader may have noticed
that the bargaining scenario we have described is based on the
Coase Theorem, first introduced in Professor Ronald Coase's fa-
mous article, The Problem of Social Cost.65 The Coase Theorem
can be understood at several different levels, 66 but no extended dis-
cussion of them is necessary for our purposes. Placed in the present
context, the Theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs
or other legal impediments to bargaining, a party who can realize
external economic benefits only with concurrence of another party
will bargain with that party and reach an agreement under which
the two of them will share the benefits. Such a result is economi-
cally efficient because it allows the realization of a benefit that
would otherwise be wasted.
Professor Robert Cooter has suggested, however, that the
Coase Theorem may be unduly optimistic and that a bargain may
not always be struck despite the fact that it is in the self-interest of
both parties to strike it.67 One possible explanation for bargaining
failure might be high transaction costs. In the mortgage prepay-
ment context, such costs obviously exist, but they hardly seem pro-
hibitive. Fortunately, there is only one party on each side of the
table. Thus, unlike several of Coase's original illustrations involv-
ing groups of farmers or other landowners, there are no costs in-
volved in bringing together groups of people on each side of the
transaction and getting them to reach consensus on bargaining posi-
tion. In addition, the cost of information about the current state of
the market is low; indeed, the lender probably possesses that infor-
mation (assuming that it is still in the mortgage lending business).
By making a few phone calls to mortgage bankers and brokers the
borrower can effectively learn enough to bargain. Negotiation also
requires time and effort, both for the parties and perhaps for their
65. 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
66. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 293 (1992).
67. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982).
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attorneys as well. But because the question under discussion
("How much will you accept to let me out of this loan?") is not
particularly complex, the parties should be able to find a satisfac-
tory resolution without a large investment of time or resources.
Moreover, as Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, transac-
tion costs in a Coasian bargain are a two-edged sword. If they are
excessive, they may discourage or stultify negotiation. If they are
only moderate, however, they may actually encourage a quick reso-
lution as the parties attempt to reach a consensus without "running
the meter" unnecessarily. 68
Cooter has suggested that bargaining may fail for a different
reason, applicable even if the negotiation process is costless. Specifi-
cally, bargaining will fail if there is no institutional mechanism,
such as the market, to dictate the terms of the contract. The bor-
rower and lender must negotiate, not in a competitive market, but
in a bilateral monopoly relationship. This is to say that they can
deal only with each other; their contractual relationship binds them
together, and each of them can escape it only by reaching agree-
ment with the other. There are no alternative parties to whom they
can turn. In the example above, in which refinancing produces a
surplus of $182,564, the lender may be satisfied with $1, with the
entire $182,564, or with any amount in between. Of course the par-
ties will not likely achieve these polar extremes since each party
must spend at least a modest amount to document the severance of
their relationship, and each will presumably insist on retaining a bit
more of the surplus than the cost of doing so. Nonetheless, there is
a very wide range of possible outcomes, and no mechanism-
neither market nor custom nor governmental regulator-exists to
narrow that range. In these circumstances, either or both of the
parties will possibly assume "hard" bargaining positions, refusing to
relent from them in time to save the process from failure.
Nonetheless, the nature of mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
suggests that the parties will achieve a successful outcome through
negotiation. Because the parties are sophisticated and well-in-
formed about the other's costs and opportunities, they will be less
susceptable to having advantage taken of them. When negotiating
with an experienced commercial developer, a lender will not take
the position that it might take against an inexperienced consumer
(e.g., "as a matter of policy, we never negotiate our prepayment
fees"). Additionally, because the parties have or expect to have
68. Hovenkamp, supra note 66, at 300 n.29.
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other business relationships with each other and because each be-
longs to a relatively small fraternity of players who periodically
communicate with each other spreading reputational information
about the opposing party, neither the lender nor the borrower will
serve his or her own interest by being obdurate and unreasonable.
Given these facts, most prepayment negotiations between bor-
rower and lender will result in a deal. Doubtless some bargaining
failures do and will occur, but since the Coasian model reflects real-
ity with sufficient regularity, it provides a fully acceptable working
assumption for further analysis.
Its implications are surprising. When a borrower contemplates
a voluntary prepayment, even grossly excessive prepayment fees
have no significance in terms of economic efficiency. They do not
force the borrower to forego obtaining more efficient financing but
merely compel the borrower to negotiate with the lender to share
the savings that result from that financing. Hence, they involve
nothing more than a transfer of income from borrower to lender,
and as shown above, the amount of that transfer will not exceed the
savings that the borrower realizes from the refinancing, however ex-
pensive the stated prepayment fee may be.69
This scenario is equitable. Since we have postulated that
knowledgeable parties freely entered the arrangement, there is no
basis to attack it. In a sense, the borrower's costs on the original
loan include the potential obligation to transfer this income to the
lender. If there were no prepayment fee clauses, the market would
presumably drive up interest rates or front-end loan fees to compen-
sate lenders in the aggregate by producing for them the same in-
come as if the clause had been present.
In summary, two distinct economic arguments favor the en-
forcement of prepayment fee clauses when a voluntary prepayment
occurs. First, the clause represents a form of insurance that a less
risk-averse lender offers to a more risk-averse borrower; it permits
the borrower to limit the amount owed the lender if the borrower
prepays. Such voluntary shifting of risk enhances economic effi-
ciency and should be encouraged. Second, even when resulting in a
stated fee far in excess of the lender's loss, the prepayment clause
does not discourage the borrower from searching for and obtaining
more efficient financing but merely compels him or her to share
69. I am indebted to the author of Note, Economic Analysis, supra note 40, at
1077-79, for pointing this out, although in a different context.
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with the lender the financial benefits of the new financing. Hence,
the clause introduces neither inefficiency nor inequity.
C. Economic Arguments Against Enforceability
Some factors in the mortgage prepayment environment may
militate against the conclusions just stated. To examine this ques-
tion, we can turn to more general economic analyses of liquidated
damage clauses and critiques of their enforceability. As noted
above, economists have usually regarded enforcement of these
clauses as efficient and hence appropriate. However, contrary argu-
ments can be made in some circumstances.
One such circumstance is a contract in which the party that
has the benefit of the liquidated damages clause can influence the
other party to commit a breach. This situation often exists, for ex-
ample, in construction contracts in which the parties must, as a
practical matter, cooperate with one another continuously on mat-
ters such as review of plans and specifications, and inspection of
work in progress. Assume that in a contract to construct a house,
the parties agree that the builder must pay the landowner $100 for
each day that completion of construction is delayed beyond the
agreed time. If the landowner discovers that, for personal reasons,
she will be unable to occupy the house for several months after the
completion date, she will have a strong incentive to encourage delay
in completion. By doing so, she may realize a windfall under the
clause even though she suffers no actual damage. To create this
delay she may begin to "nit-pick" the quality of the builder's work,
become unavailable for scheduled inspections, and bog down the
construction process in other ways. Obviously these activities are
inefficient; they contribute nothing to the production of useful
goods or services. The landowner's actions will prevent the
builder's equipment and personnel from moving on to another pro-
ject according to schedule. Moreover, the builder may engage in
costly activity in an attempt to discover and prove that the land-
owner is being dilatory or acting in bad faith. This activity, too, is
wasteful.
The case described above is one in which the nonbreaching
party suffers no damages, but the analysis is the same when the non-
breaching party recognizes that the actual damages (including the
cost of any breach-inducing activity) will be less costly than the liq-
uidated damages provision. Hence, refusing to enforce an agreed
damages clause is rational in any case in which the nonbreaching
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party is willing to induce breach because the clause will produce a
recovery that significantly exceeds actual damages.70
While this argument is convincing in the house construction
context described above, it has no application to prepayment in the
lender-borrower relationship because the lender has no breach-in-
ducing activity available. 71 While the lender may recognize that a
prepayment (and collection of the concomitant fee) would be to its
advantage, the lender cannot encourage a prepayment. We might
expect lenders in such an environment (.e., where rates have re-
mained stable or fallen only a little since the loan was made, and
where the prepayment fee greatly exceeds the amount necessary to
cover the lender's actual damages) to be especially strict in dealing
with defaults in payment by the borrower,72 but if the borrower is
punctilious in performing his or her obligations, the lender can do
little more.
Public policy also militates against the enforcement of agreed
damages clauses because they may amount to gambling contracts. 73
But such a policy is inapplicable in the context of prepayment fee
clauses. As Professors Clarkson, Miller and Muris have pointed
out, a contract is a wager only if it is unreasonable when it is en-
tered into. If it is reasonably conceivable at that time that the non-
breaching party's actual damages will be as high as the stipulated
70. See Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or
Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351, 366-72; Note, Economic Analysis, supra note 40, at
1080-81.
71. Clarkson et al., supra note 70, at 387, recognize this fact explicitly. They dis-
cuss some apparently contrary cases in which courts have refused to enforce agreed
damage clauses between borrowers and lenders in cases of default (not simple prepay-
ment), and suggest that these courts may be motivated by concepts of usury or excessive
interest. They correctly point out that clauses providing for forfeiture of mortgage loan
commitment fees when the borrower fails to complete the loan and borrow the funds are
routinely upheld. Id.; see Woodbridge Place Apartments v. Washington Square Capi-
tal, Inc., 965 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1992); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 12.3
n.26.
72. There is evidence that lenders display less lenient attitudes toward default when
interest rates have risen and the loan is insured by a governmental or private mortgage
insurance agency, so that default and foreclosure are virtually costless or actually profit-
able to the lender. See J. Harold Mulherin & Walter J. Muller, III, Volatile Interest
Rates and the Divergence of Incentives in Mortgage Contracts, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGANI-
ZATION 99, 101-02 (1987). The existence of a prepayment fee clause which is enforcea-
ble upon default and acceleration will obviously have, to some degree, the same effect as
a contract of mortgage insurance, since the prepayment fee will tend to offset the costs
of foreclosure and any inadequacy in the value of the real estate as security for the loan.
As to whether the courts do or should permit collection of prepayment fees when the
prepayment is a result of default and acceleration of the loan, see infra notes 176-189.
73. See Note, Economic Analysis, supra note 40, at 1091-93.
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amount, the clause is in essence insurance rather than a bet.74 In
the case of mortgage loan prepayment, as I have suggested above,
an advance estimate of damages is no more than a guess since the
interest markets are intrinsically volatile; hence, only the most ex-
treme prepayment fee imaginable could be regarded as a gambling
contract.
Fairness and conscionability considerations may argue against
enforcement of a liquidated damages clause. Nonenforcement may
be appropriate if the borrower did not understand the clause or if
the parties had such drastically disparate bargaining power that the
borrower was virtually compelled to sign the lender's form.75 Such
arguments are compelling when the borrower is an unsophisticated
consumer borrowing a relatively small amount and the loan is docu-
mented on preprinted forms. But because prepayment restrictions
have disappeared from home loan documents, nearly all borrowers
who deal with such restrictions today are sophisticated in real estate
transactions, represented by counsel, and entirely capable of carry-
ing on effective negotiations with lenders. Borrowers will not al-
ways or usually get their way; if that were so, the final loan
documents would rarely contain prepayment restrictions. But there
are no industry-wide "standard" prepayment clauses. Each lender
has its own approaches and preferences, and at least some lenders
do indeed modify prepayment clauses in response to borrower nego-
tiations, and perhaps in response to a borrower's willingness to pay
a higher price for the loan. Most borrowers, in turn, shop the mar-
ket, knowing what to look for. The market is not perfect, but
74. See Clarkson et al., supra note 70, at 365 n.48.
75. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990); Todd D. Rakoff, Con-
tracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); Justin
Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CAL. L. REV. 84 (1972).
One of the most attractive taxonomies of "unconscionable" contracts is set out in
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741,
754-85 (1982). Eisenberg suggests four contexts in which the courts should refuse en-
forcement of contracts on unconscionability grounds: distress, in which a party's sur-
vival or fundamental needs compel him or her to contract; transactional incapacity, in
which a party lacks sufficient experience, training, or specialized knowledge to appreci-
ate the significance of a contract term; unfair persuasion, in which a party contracts
while in a weakened or debilitated condition and is unable to fend off the other party's
importunings; and price ignorance, in which a party is unfamiliar with market prices
and is misled into believing the contract price fairly represents the market. It is signifi-
cant that none of these four conditions is likely to exist in a commercial real estate loan
negotiation. Borrowers are rarely under great pressure to make a deal with a particular
lender, and they (or their counsel) generally have a high degree of experience with and
information about the mortgage market, prices, and contract terms.
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neither is it characterized by the sort of uninformed behavior by
borrowers that traditionally leads courts and legislatures to inter-
vene and declare contractual clauses unenforceable.
As the preceding discussion reveals, the nature of this situation
determines whether the "terms of adhesion" argument should and
should not be available. Several recent model and federal statutes
and regulations adopt consumer protection measures that are lim-
ited to loans for "personal, family, or household purposes. ' 76 This
bright-line test is convenient, and probably necessary for a statutory
formulation. It coincides well with realities in the mortgage mar-
ket, in which prepayment fees and restrictions have largely disap-
peared in financings for "personal, family, or household purposes."
But when a court, unaided by statute, is asked to determine
whether concepts of adhesion contracts should bar enforcement of a
prepayment fee or restriction, it ought not to answer that question
by noting that the borrower's residence is the security or that the
borrower is a "consumer." Rather, the court should consider
whether the borrower fully understood and had the opportunity to
bargain over the clause, either with the assistance of counsel or by
virtue of the borrower's own experience and expertise. Phrases
such as "personal, family, or household purposes" or "owner-occu-
pied home" are mere proxies for the underlying issue of borrower
understanding and bargaining opportunity. I employ the phrase
"bargaining opportunity" here merely to indicate that the borrower
was fully aware of the impact of the prepayment clause and that he
or she at least considered raising it in the negotiation process. A
knowledgeable borrower might reasonably review a proposed
clause, understand its significance, and conclude that it is accepta-
ble in the overall context of the proposed transaction. Thus,
although no overt discussion of the clause between lender and bor-
rower might occur, "bargaining opportunity" exists. Actual, ex-
plicit bargaining is a useful indicator that the borrower consciously
and fully understood the clause, but it is not the only possible evi-
dence of that fact.
76. See, e.g., UCCC § 1.301(15) (official 1974 text); Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1988); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12) (1992) (implementing
the Truth in Lending Act); Federal Trade Commission Holder-in-Due-Course Regula-
tion, 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(b) (1992); Federal Trade Commission Credit Practices Rules, 16
C.F.R. § 444.1(d) (1992). A different but similar approach is taken by the Uniform
Land Security Interest Act, which defines a "protected party" as "an individual who
gives a security interest in residential real estate all or a part of which the individual
occupies or intends to occupy as a residence." UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT
§ 113, 7A U.L.A. 190, 199 (Supp. 1992).
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Most commercial loan mortgagors probably satisfy the under-
standing and bargaining opportunity test, but there may be excep-
tions. On the other hand, many borrowers on owner-occupied
homes probably would not meet this test, although occasionally one
may do so. A court may well be warranted in refusing to enforce a
prepayment restriction clause if the borrower lacked the necessary
understanding and bargaining opportunity, whether the loan was
commercial or residential in nature. But if understanding and bar-
gaining opportunity were present, as is the case with most prepay-
ment clauses today, the court need not intervene on the basis of the
"term of adhesion" concept. 77
D. Legal Arguments Against Enforceability
I have argued above that a prepayment fee clause is a form of a
liquidated damage provision. However, virtually all of the state
court decisions treat prepayment fees without reference to the law
of liquidated damages. This is perplexing, but it may be explained
by the badly muddled condition of the law of liquidated damages.
Perhaps the most commonly cited statement of the law dealing with
liquidated damage clauses is that found in the first Restatement of
Contracts, which holds such clauses unenforceable unless:
(a) [t]he amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compen-
sation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable
or very difficult of accurate estimation. 78
The difficulties with this formulation are legion. First, it seems self-
contradictory: a valid clause is one which makes a reasonable esti-
mate of something that cannot reasonably be estimated. Moreover,
as numerous commentators have remarked, 79 the formula is seri-
77. Even where the borrower is sophisticated, the usual range of contract de-
fenses-such as fraud, mistake, duress, and undue influence-might still be present.
For example, the borrower may well have a defense to enforcement of the restrictions if
the borrower accepts a loan commitment that mentions no prepayment restrictions or
only very minor restrictions, and the lender at closing substitutes documents adopting
different and more onerous restrictions, while either failing to point out the change to
the borrower or pointing it out in circumstances in which the borrower has made other
commitments and has no practical choice but to close. Cf. Frame v. Boatmen's Bank,
824 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (lender issued mortgage commitment to commer-
cial borrower without advising him that approval of another lender, which was expected
to participate in the loan, was essential; first lender held liable for negligent
misrepresentation).
78. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
79. See Susan V. Ferris, Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 862, 868 (1982); William S. Har-
wood, Comment, Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of the Common Law and the
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ously defective because of its failure to specify the time-frame
within which its tests are to be made. Is the "reasonable forecast"
to be judged as of the date of contracting (an ex ante test) or the
date of breach (an ex post test)? There is little consistency in the
case results, and ample authority can be found for viewing reasona-
bleness as of either date, 80 or requiring reasonableness at either"' or
both times.8 2 Often it is impossible to determine which test a court
has employed.
The second fork of the Restatement's formula is equally ambig-
uous: must the harm be difficult to estimate as of the date of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1349, 1350-51 (1977); Note, Eco-
nomic Analysis, supra note 40, at 1063-65.
80. For cases requiring reasonableness as of the date of contracting, see, e.g.,
H.M.O. Sys. v. Choicecare Health Servs., Inc., 665 P.2d 635, 638 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983);
Heikkila v. Carver, 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D. 1985); Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d
44, 47 (Utah 1983); Knight, Vale & Gregor v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448, 453 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1984).
For cases requiring reasonableness as of the date of breach, see, e.g., Williams v.
Cotten, 684 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985); Perez v. Aerospace Academy, Inc., 546
So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Hershey v. Simpson, 725 P.2d 196, 200
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986); Shapiro v. Grinspoon, 541 N.E.2d 359, 365 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989); Boyle v. Petrie Stores Corp., 518 N.Y.S.2d 854, 861-62 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Soffe v.
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983).
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18 (1990) (asserting that the ma-
jority view tests reasonableness as of the date of contracting).
81. Decisions accepting a liquidation of damages which was reasonable at either
time may be based on or influenced by U.C.C. § 2-718(1), which approves liquidations
"at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm."
U.C.C. § 2-718(i) (1988) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Stock Shop, Inc. v. Bozell & Ja-
cobs, Inc., 481 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Illingworth v. Bushong, 688 P.2d
379, 389-90 (Or. 1984).
82. See, e.g., Morris v. Flores, 528 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (clause
enforceable if the amount was reasonable at the time of the contract and bears some
relation to actual damages); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 220
A.2d 263, 267-68 (Conn. 1966), discussed in Lind Bldg. Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Devs.,
776 P.2d 977, 980-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Note, Economic Analysis, supra note 40,
at 1072-74.
The English courts have had little more success than the American courts in clari-
fying the time at which reasonableness is to be measured. The classic statement is that
of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage & Motor Co., 1915
App. Cas. 79, 87 (appeal taken from Eng.) (citation omitted):
(a) It will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant
and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss
which could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach
[apparently an ex ante test].
(b) It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying
a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum
which ought to have been paid [apparently an ex post test].
See 1 CHITrY ON CONTRACTS 1389-91 (John Morris ed., 22d ed. 1961); M.P. FURM-
STON, CHESHIRE & FIFOOT's LAW OF CONTRACT 607-11 (9th ed. 1976).
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contract or the date of breach? Here the decisions have been
equally inconsistent, sometimes upholding clauses on this point if
the harm was difficult to predict when the contract was negoti-
ated, 83 and in other cases scrutinizing the difficulty of measuring
damages at the time of the breach.84
The Restatement (Second) does not clarify the matter.8 5 It re-
tains, but in a more obscure form, the twin requirements of reasona-
bleness of amount and difficulty of proof. They are now described
as interrelated, so that greater difficulty of proof will justify greater
departure from reasonableness.8 6 The text of the Restatement states
that reasonableness may be tested either ex post or ex ante, sug-
gesting that the test is made "in light of the anticipated or actual
loss caused by the breach. ' '87 Under this reading, a reasonable fig-
ure from either perspective would sustain the clause. Yet of the
four illustrations given, only one involves a case in which the clause
produces a damage figure that is reasonable at one time and unrea-
sonable at the other,88 and in that instance the illustration indicates
that the courts should reject the clause.
With regard to the second test, the difficulty of estimation of
actual damages, the Restatement (Second) is even more cryptic.
The text makes no reference to the issue of timing. The Reporter's
Note states that "the difficulties of proof of loss are to be deter-
mined at the time the contract is made, not at the time of the
breach,"'89 yet two of the four illustrations plainly test difficulty of
proof as of the date of breach. 90
83. See Rohauer v. Little, 736 P.2d 403, 410 (Colo. 1987); Coldwell Banker-First
Realty, Inc. v. Meide & Son, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 375 (N.D. 1988); Taylor v. Sanders, 353
S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (Va. 1987).
84. Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A.2d 1022, 1028-29 (Conn. 1980); Marron &
Sipe Bldg. & Contracting Corp. v. Flor, 580 A.2d 508, 517 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990);
Bennett v. Les Schwab Tire Ctrs., Inc., 618 P.2d 455, 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Johnson
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah 1977); Taylor, 353 S.E.2d at 746-47.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979).
86. Id. cmt. b.
87. Id. § 356(1) (emphasis added).
88. The case is one in which a contract for construction of a racetrack provides for
liquidated damages of $1000 for each day of delay beyond the agreed date of comple-
tion. The contractor delays, but because of difficulty in obtaining governmental ap-
proval to operate, the racetrack owner is not damaged at all. The agreed damages were
presumably reasonable ex ante but obviously unreasonable ex post; the illustration
states that enforcement should be denied. Id. cmt. b, illus. 4.
89. Id. cmt. b, Reporter's Note (citation omitted).
90. Illustration 4, described supra note 88, proceeds on the premise that "the actual
loss to [the race track owner] is not difficult to prove." Id. cmt. b, illus. 4. Similar
language is found in id. cmt. b, illus. 2.
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In the context of prepayment fee clauses, the debate about the
timing of the reasonableness and difficulty-of-estimation tests is sig-
nificant, since the damages that a lender suffers as a result of pre-
payment are incapable of accurate estimation in advance but are
easy to compute when the prepayment occurs. Consequently, al-
most any estimate may be considered reasonable at the time the
loan is made, but such an estimate will often turn out, in the actual
event, to miss the mark widely.
On the whole, this body of law hardly represents the finest
achievement of American jurisprudence. Because the "rules" are so
fuzzy, case outcomes are unpredictable. As Professor Debora
Threedy recently put it, "the cases remain awash in contradictory
results and analyses." 9' The state of the law can be defended only if
one believes that courts should have virtually unfettered ad hoc dis-
cretion to enforce or reject liquidated damages clauses.
As mentioned above, state courts have ignored the law of liqui-
dated damages (perhaps appropriately) when faced with the issue
of the validity of prepayment fee clauses. The California Court of
Appeal's opinion in the Lazzareschi case illustrates this attitude:
In the instant case, there has been no breach. The borrower had
the option, clearly spelled out in the promissory note, of making
one or more prepayments. He ... availed himself of the option.
This is not a situation of liquidated damages. Although the word
"penalty" is used ... there is no penalty in the sense of retribu-
tion for breach of an agreement, nor is there provision for liqui-
dated damages because of [the difficulty of] ascertaining what the
damages for such breach may be.92
Thus the Lazzareschi court avoided application of the rules
concerning liquidated damages by the expedient of declaring the
prepayment fee clause to be an alternative mode of performance
rather than a stipulation of damages for breach. This is inaccurate,
of course. The difference between a clause providing liquidated
damages for breach and an optional mode of performance, at least
in the context of mortgage loan prepayment, is entirely illusory.
Any skilled drafter can modify a contract so that a breach becomes
an optional performance. 93 A clause providing for liquidated dam-
91. Threedy, supra note 58, at 441.
92. Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Say. & Loan Ass'n, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417,
420 (Ct. App. 1971). The bracketed words do not appear in the text, but seem neces-
sary to make it sensible.
93. This point is nicely dealt with in In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1990). Of course there is a technical difference between payment of liquidated
damages and an alternative performance; as Professor Corbin observed, when one's per-
formance is a condition to some return performance by the other party, one may earn
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ages for breach of the promise not to prepay does not practically
differ from a clause providing for performance by paying a prepay-
ment fee.
Shortly after the Lazzareschi decision, in Garrett v. Coast &
Southern Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n 94 the California Supreme
Court recognized the fatuous nature of the "alternative perform-
ance" argument. The case was a class action by some 32,000 mort-
gage borrowers who attacked the validity of a "late charge" clause
obligating them to pay additional interest at the rate of two percent
per annum of the loan balance during the period that any install-
ment payment was delinquent. The lender characterized the clause
as merely calling for alternative performances, but the court gave
this argument no credence, analyzing it instead as a liquidation of
damages.
The mere fact that an agreement may be construed... to vest in
one party an option to perform in a manner which, if it were not
so construed, would result in a penalty does not validate the
agreement....
... We recognized, of course, the validity of provisions va-
rying the acceptable performance under a contract upon the hap-
pening of a contingency. We cannot, however, so subvert the
substance of a contract to form that we lose sight of the bar-
gained-for performance. Thus when it is manifest that a contract
expressed to be performed in the alternative is in fact a contract
contemplating but a single, definite performance with an addi-
tional charge contingent on the breach of that performance, the
provision cannot escape examination in light of pertinent rules
relative to the liquidation of damages.95
The prepayment clause is closely analogous and should be treated
similarly. Two facts in the prepayment context lead inexorably to-
that return performance by whatever alternatives are recognized in the contract, but
one could never earn it by breaching and paying liquidated damages. See 5 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1070, at 397 (1964). Corbin's point is valid, but it
has no relevance to the lender-borrower relationship, in which the lender has already
fully performed by making the initial loan. See also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 577
(1977) ("The Restatement of Contracts, in classic understatement, recognizes that en-
forceable alternative contracts may easily be confused with invalid liquidated damage
provisions.").
94. 511 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1973).
95. Id. at 1200-01 (footnotes omitted); see also Sybron Corp. v. Clark Hosp. Sup-
ply Corp., 143 Cal. Rptr. 306, 308-09 (Ct. App. 1978); Willis v. Community Develop-
ers, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (late fee charged to borrower was an
invalid penalty).
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ward this conclusion: first, it is payment on time, rather than early
payment with a fee, that the lender primarily desires and for which
the lender bargains; and second, prepayment may cause the lender
substantial damage, and the fee's obvious purpose is to compensate
for that damage. A prepayment is simply a breach of the bor-
rower's primary promise-to pay the loan on schedule-and a
court ought not permit the drafter of the documents to disguise that
fact. In this sense, the Lazzareschi opinion was wrong.
Nevertheless, Lazzareschi's result was correct. Under the eco-
nomic analysis already discussed, a freely-bargained prepayment fee
clause ought to be enforced against the borrower who makes a vol-
untary prepayment, irrespective of the amount of money that the
lender's clause demands. The Lazzareschi court can be forgiven for
its reluctance to apply the botched-up law of liquidated damages to
the prepayment clause before it. Nevertheless, the court should
have recognized the clause for what it was-a liquidation of dam-
ages. The court could then have disregarded the confusing pastiche
of liquidated damage clause precedent and upheld it. This conclu-
sion is consistent with the view of most modem commentators that
courts should enforce liquidated damages clauses in fairly bargained
contracts without regard to the supposed tests of reasonableness
and difficulty of estimating damages. 96 It is also consistent with
nearly all of the nonbankruptcy cases involving voluntary
prepayments. 97
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PREPAYMENT FEES IN BANKRUPTCY
During the past decade a number of bankruptcy cases have re-jected the Lazzareschi approach and considered the validity of pre-
payment fees under a liquidated damages analysis. The results have
been of mixed merit, in part because of the crude state of the law of
liquidated damages. Nonetheless, these cases are significant since
they represent a departure from long-standing legal doctrine. They
also provide an opportunity for a fresh look at the policy implica-
tions of the economic analysis presented above.
The earliest of these cases (and one which involves no mort-
gage security) is In re United Merchants & Manufacturers.98 Two
lenders made large unsecured loans to the debtor, United. When
96. See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 40; Sweet, supra note 75; Threedy, supra note 58;
Weisfield, supra note 58; Note, supra note 40.
97. See cases cited supra notes 21-26.
98. United Merchants & Mfrs. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 674 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1982).
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United entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy and defaulted on the loans,
the lenders filed claims which included the outstanding principal
and prepetition interest, various collection costs, and prepayment
fees. Express language in the loan agreements provided that the
prepayment fees were due even if the prepayment resulted from de-
fault and acceleration rather than the debtor's voluntary payment.
The clauses under which the prepayment fees were claimed were
apparently similar to the Type II clause described above, and pro-
duced fees of about eight percent of the loan balances.
The debtor in possession argued that the fees were unenforce-
able as excessive and invalid liquidated damages. But the court ap-
plied New York law, which it found to approve liquidated damages
clauses if the actual damages were difficult to determine and the
liquidated sum was not plainly disproportionate to the possible loss,
both of these factors being assessed at the time of contracting rather
than the time of breach. 99 Applying this test, the court found that
damages were difficult to predict. Since the court considered the
fees to be not "plainly disproportionate," it upheld the clause. The
opinion offered no detailed discussion of either prong of the test, but
its conclusion is correct if one accepts the premise that the test is to
be applied prospectively as of the date of the agreement. 10
Although it upheld the prepayment fee in full, United
Merchants is a highly significant case because it marks the first time
that a court recognized that a prepayment fee clause is a form of
liquidated damages. That it arose from a prepayment incident to
default and acceleration rather than the borrower's decision to pre-
pay, and that the loan was unsecured, eased the court's break from
the strictures of Lazzareschi, enabling it to deal with the fee clause
as a species of liquidated damages.
In In re Schaumburg Hotel Owner Limited Partnership,10
which involved similar facts except that the loan was secured by a
mortgage on real estate, the court followed United Merchants. The
99. Id. at 142-43. As authority for its view of New York law, the court cited its
own opinion in Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896
(2d Cir. 1972). While the court observed that Heller was "remarkably similar" to the
instant case, Heller involved not a prepayment or loan default, but rather a borrower's
failure to consummate a loan transaction despite a firm contractual obligation to do so.
Id. The court in United Merchants cited no prior case in which a prepayment fee had
been analyzed as a form of liquidation of damages.
100. The court also held that the lenders' collection of the fees violated no principle
of bankruptcy law or policy, although it implied that it might have found such a viola-
tion if the debtor had been able to show that the lenders suffered no damage at all from
the prepayment. United Merchants, 674 F.2d at 143-44.
101. 97 B.R. 943, 953-54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
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Schaumburg court adopted an identical rationale and result. In
Schaumburg the clause provided for a flat fee of ten percent of the
amount prepaid. While the court employed a "time-of-contracting"
analysis of the liquidated damage argument, it also placed some em-
phasis on the secured lender's testimony that the prepayment clause
produced an amount that was significantly less than the lender's
actual damages; hence, the lender received no windfall.
Far more significantly, United Merchants has given rise to a
cluster of bankruptcy cases that apply a liquidated damages analysis
to strike down or severely limit prepayment fee clauses. While some
of these decisions discuss whether, as a preliminary matter, the fee
is enforceable under state law, all of them focus primarily on
whether the fee is allowable as a secured claim against the real es-
tate. That question is governed by section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which recognizes such claims for "reasonable fees, costs, or
charges" provided for in the agreement. 0 2 Allowance as a secured
claim is often of paramount importance to the mortgage lender,
since if the fee is unsecured it will take its place pro rata with the
other general debts of the bankrupt, and will usually be satisfied
only in small part or not at all. For the court to allow the fee, the
lender must satisfy the "reasonableness" test of section 506(b).
The earliest of these cases is In re American Metals Corp. ,!03 in
which a loan secured by personal property provided for a "termina-
tion charge" of $20,000 per month for each remaining month of the
loan term. When the debtor filed bankruptcy (which constituted a
default under the loan agreement), the lender filed a claim that in-
cluded both the loan balance and the "termination charge." The
security was more than adequate to cover the balance owing on the
debt, and the court was therefore called upon to decide whether the
prepayment fee should also be allowed as a secured claim under
section 506(b).
The court distinguished the United Merchants case on two
grounds. First, United Merchants had merely involved the validity
of the claim for the fee and not its secured status, and thus had not
required application of section 506(b). Second, the American Met-
als court found (with little detailed analysis) that the fee was unrea-
sonable and disproportionate to the lender's actual damages
resulting from prepayment, and further that those damages were
readily susceptible to estimation. Thus the court adopted typical
102. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
103. 31 B.R. 229, 236-37 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
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state law terminology distinguishing valid liquidated damages from
invalid penalties, employed a "time of breach" approach, and found
unreasonableness under section 506(b) on the facts.'°4
Attempting to reconcile United Merchants with American Met-
als starkly reflects the difficulties inherent in state law on liquidated
damages clauses. United Merchants applied the twin criteria of rea-
sonability and difficulty of estimation as of the date of the contract,
while American Metals tested them as of the date of the breach.
10 5
If the former approach is employed, prepayment fees in Type I or
Type II clauses (in which the amount of the fee is fixed as a percent-
age of the amount being prepaid) will nearly always be upheld, since
the future vagaries of the interest market are wholly unpredictable
and nearly any fee may be considered reasonable. If the latter view
is taken, however, any fee that exceeds the lender's actual damage
will be struck down. Both of these decisions are unsatisfactory;
they fail to provide any clear-cut rationale for the timing of the
tests, and their application of the tests to the facts is almost wholly
conclusory. Nonetheless, they break important ground, suggesting
that the uniform state court practice of upholding prepayment fees
will not necessarily prevail in the bankruptcy courts.
Several more recent bankruptcy cases recognize that to be en-
forceable as a secured claim, a prepayment clause must satisfy both
the state law of liquidated damages and section 506(b). Both of
these legal regimens may demand reasonableness. As we have al-
ready seen, state law is exceptionally variable and unpredictable,
and may require the clause to be tested as of the date of contracting
or the date of the prepayment; most of the bankruptcy decisions
adopt the former view. 106 Under section 506(b), on the other hand,
both the context of the statute and the cases plainly require reasona-
bleness of the fee at the time of prepayment 0 7 although the courts
104. Id.
105. The American Metals approach was also employed in In re Imperial Coronado
Partners, 96 B.R. 997, 1000-01 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989), in which the court held that
under § 506(b) the prepayment fee must be tested for reasonableness as of the time of
payment; the case was remanded for findings of fact on this issue.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. Holding that state law requires rea-
sonableness at time of contracting, see In re Schaumburg Hotel Owner Ltd. Partner-
ship, 97 B.R. 943, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997,
999 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Morse Tool, Inc., 87 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988); In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500, 504 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
107. In re 433 South Beverly Drive, 117 B.R. 563, 569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990);
Imperial Coronado, 96 B.R. at 1001; Morse Tool, 87 B.R. at 750; American Metals, 31
B.R. at 237. Arguably contra, although the opinion is ambiguous on the point, is
Schaumburg Hotel, 97 B.R. at 953; see also Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 1001 (clause is inher-
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sometimes appropriate state law liquidated damage concepts, such
as ease of estimation, in assessing reasonableness. In terms of out-
come, the two theories are conceptually different: a denial of en-
forceability under state law leads to a total rejection of the claim,
while a denial under section 506(b) leads only to disallowance as a
secured claim. But in many cases this distinction has no practical
importance because there are so many unsecured creditors pursuing
so few assets after the mortgagee has largely exhausted the realty.
Most of these cases deal with (and reject) clauses similar to
Type I or Type II discussed above: a fee of $20,000 multiplied by
the number of months remaining in the loan term; 10 8 a fee of one
percent of the prepayment amount, times the number of years re-
maining in the term;109 a three-year loan with a fee of five percent of
the balance in the first year, four percent in the second year, and
three percent in the third year;' 10 and a fee of six-months' interest
on the amount being prepaid.' All of these fee structures have a
sort of arbitrariness about them that seems to irritate bankruptcy
judges, particularly in light of the ease with which the lender's ac-
tual loss can be computed. As one bankruptcy judge stated, "[a]ny
prepayment charge should be wholly or largely dependent upon
such a calculation [of actual loss]. 11 2 Several of the decisions sim-
ply hold that under section 506(b), the lender can never recover
more than its actual loss; 113 under this view, the mortgage clause
fixes a ceiling, but not a floor, for the recovery. Hence the usual
judicial technique is to hold the clause unenforceable only in part,
and to enforce it to the extent of the lender's actual loss, if any.
What, then, should the courts do with a Type III clause-that
is, one that purports to base the prepayment fee on actual condi-
tions in the mortgage market at the time of the prepayment? In In
ently unreasonable at time of contracting, and hence is per se unreasonable at time of
prepayment).
108. American Metals, 31 B.R. at 236.
109. In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821, 823 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
110. Morse Tool, 87 B.R. at 747.
111. Imperial Coronado, 96 B.R. at 999.
112. A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 829.
113. Imperial Coronado, 96 B.R. at 1001 ("[A] lender is entitled, under section
506(b), to collect only the difference between (1) the market rate of interest on the
prepayment date, and (2) the contract rate .... "); Morse Tool, 87 B.R. at 750
("[S]ection 506(b) requires that the clause be enforced, but only to the extent that the
secured party suffered actual and necessary damages."); In re American Metals Corp.,
31 B.R. 229, 237 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) ("[S]ection 506(b) is limited to actual costs,
charges or damages.").
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re Skyler Ridge,1 4 the court dealt with a prepayment fee claimed by
Travelers Insurance Co. in a mortgage loan on an apartment com-
plex. The specific clause in that case provided the following proce-
dure for computing the fee: First, an interest rate differential was to
be calculated by subtracting the yield rate on 1995 U.S. Treasury
notes from the mortgage note rate. 115 The actual differential thus
calculated on the facts was about two percent. This interest differ-
ential was then multiplied by the number of years remaining on the
loan and then by the principal amount being prepaid. The clause
also imposed a "floor" fee of one percent of the principal, even if the
interest rate differential formula produced a lower fee or none at all.
The parties stipulated that this should be regarded as a liqui-
dated damage clause, and the court accepted that characterization.
It analyzed the validity of the clause under the law of Kansas,
where the loan was made. Under Kansas liquidated damages law,
the court concluded that the time of contracting was the relevant
date for analysis of the clause's validity. The court had no trouble
agreeing with the lender that predicting its damages at that date
would have been difficult indeed. However, it found that the other
prong of the standard test-reasonableness-was not satisfied.
The court raised several specific objections to the reasonable-
ness of the fee. First, it noted that the use of the yield on U.S.
Treasury notes as a reference point for determining the lender's loss
was unrealistic. A life insurance underwriter, the lender was in the
business of making long-term mortgage loans and would not ordi-
narily invest in long-term Treasury notes except on a temporary
basis. Since the market regards Treasury notes as having extremely
low risk, they carry commensurately low returns. The yield on
mortgage loans is systematically higher by 1.3% to 2%, according
to the court's estimate. 1 6 Hence, the use of Treasury note yield as
a reinvestment rate, rather than some index of current commercial
mortgage loan yields, would consistently overcompensate the
lender.
Second, the court observed that the prepayment fee formula in
the mortgage made no attempt to discount the lender's lost interest
to its present value. Awarding the lender the present value of the
differential in interest yields differs vastly from awarding it the gross
amount of that differential. Since the lender who receives prepay-
114. 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
115. Id. at 502. The loan was made in 1986 for a ten-year term; hence, the maturity
of the specified Treasury notes was roughly equivalent to that of the loan. Id.
116. Id. at 505 (1987).
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ment receives the money immediately rather than over a number of
future years as provided in the original loan contract, and since it
will immediately put those funds to work by relending them, it is
overcompensated if the interest differential is not discounted to
present value. 117
A third form of overcompensation to the lender, not men-
tioned by the court, is built into the Travelers' clause. The clause
uses the full amount being prepaid as the principal on which the
prepayment fee is to be computed. But most mortgage loans (in-
cluding this one) provide for some regular amortization of principal
by monthly or other periodic payments. 11 8 In many cases the loan
payments are "fully amortizing," meaning that by the time of the
final monthly payment the loan's principal will be reduced to zero.
Thus the lender is expecting to receive all or a significant amount of
principal prior to final maturity of the loan even in the absence of a
prepayment. These scheduled payments force the lender to assume
the burden of reinvesting the funds, possibly at a lower interest rate.
Hence, it is unrealistic to assume, as the Travelers clause did, that
upon receipt of prepayment the lender will lose the interest rate dif-
ferential on the full principal for the full remaining term.
The court's final objection to the clause centered on the one
percent "floor" fee, which would have produced $150,000.
Although Travelers' actual damages rather clearly exceeded this
level, thus making it a moot point, the court unnecessarily criticized
the whole concept of a "floor." Travelers attempted to justify the
one percent fee by arguing that its transaction costs in originating a
loan of this magnitude were about $150,000. But the court found
this argument implausible since the clause made no provision for
amortizing the origination costs over the loan's ten-year life; the one
percent floor applied whether prepayment occurred in year two or
in year nine.
Travelers also argued that the $150,000 "floor" was designed
to compensate for its loss of earnings during the period necessary to
place the funds in a suitable reinvestment. Again the court was
117. To use the illustration given supra in the text at notes 31-32, if the loss of
future benefits to the lender were not discounted to present value, that loss would be
$135,960 rather than $85,736.
118. Perhaps the reason the court did not focus on this issue was that the scheduled
principal payments on the loan in question were minimal. The original loan balance
was $15 million; only interest payments were required for the first five years, and there-
after only sufficient amortization payments to reduce the loan balance by $250,000 by
the end of the tenth year, at which time a "balloon payment" of the entire remaining
balance was to have been made. See 80 B.R. at 502.
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unimpressed. As mentioned above, it noted that the lender who is
prepaid will doubtless "park" the funds temporarily in commercial
paper or other short-term obligations which will bear interest at
rates not too far below the commercial mortgage rate. Moreover,
the prepayment clause in this case required the borrower to give a
thirty-day advance notice of intent to prepay, allowing Travelers
considerable time to locate a longer-term reinvestment opportunity.
Because of these faults, the clause failed the state law test; it
would always give the lender a fee substantially in excess of actual
damages, and hence could not be regarded as a reasonable estimate
of actual damages, even if judged prospectively. We might call the
clause in Skyler Ridge a Type III-plus clause, with the "plus" signi-
fying that the clause is designed to overcompensate the lender's ac-
tual loss in all cases. Since the clause was unenforceable under state
law, the court did not reach the question of allowability of the fee as
a secured claim in bankruptcy under section 506(b). However, it
indicated that under that section, the test of allowability would be
actual (rather than prospective) reasonableness, and that obviously
the clause before it would fail that test as well.
Under the Skyler Ridge court's analysis, a Type I or Type II
clause providing for a fee that was prospectively reasonable (and
thus acceptable under state law) could still produce too large an
actual figure and hence fail the section 506(b) test. Ironically, how-
ever, the court's reasoning could not lead to this result under the
Type III clause of the sort at issue in the case. Since such a clause
attempts to measure the lender's damages by a formula which refers
to interest rates at the time of the prepayment, it is always possible
to make the formula a reasonable one. The instant formula failed,
but a formula that employed a realistic reference rate and accounted
for the time value of money and the scheduled payments of princi-
pal under the loan would presumably have been acceptable both
under state law and section 506(b). And since the lender could
have employed a reasonable version of the formula, the instant less-
than-reasonable version was unacceptable in the court's view.
Moreover, the consequence of unenforceability in Skyler Ridge
was draconian: the court treated the mortgage documents as if they
contained no prepayment fee clause at all. 1 9 This element of the
Skyler Ridge decision is unjustifiable. A lender that employs an
overbearing clause need not be penalized by denial of all compensa-
119. A bankruptcy judge who had handled a similar case observed to the author
that this is an example of the "hog" theory; being half a hog may get you something,
while being a total hog gets you nothing at all!
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tion for its prepayment loss. The court explained that the common
law of liquidated damages "requires the entire disallowance of the
fees sought on the grounds that they are a penalty"; 20 nevertheless,
the common law does not proceed to deny actual damages as
well. ' 2'
While Skyler Ridge and several of the other cases described
above purport to apply state law as an initial tool for determining
the enforceability of prepayment clauses, they really apply the
judges' suppositions about unknown state law. With the exception
of the California bankruptcy cases, all of them were decided in ju-
risdictions in which no state court had ever considered a prepay-
ment fee clause of the type before the bankruptcy court. The point
is not such an important one, however, since bankruptcy judges can
always fall back on section 506(b), concluding that the prepayment
clause must be disallowed as a secured claim even if a state court's
approach is unknown.
Debra Stark, an attorney who represents secured lenders, has
criticized Skyler Ridge on the ground that it holds lenders to an
unrealistic standard. 22  Stark concedes that the Skyler Ridge
court's insistence on discounting the lender's lost stream of interest
to present value is justified, but she disagrees sharply with the
court's objection to the use of the Treasury note rate as an index.
She points out that every commercial mortgage loan is unique; that
there is no "standard" published index of commercial mortgage
loan rates; that the lender may require considerable time to find an
investment comparable to the loan being prepaid; and that finding
an essentially identical loan, in terms of maturity, risk, and other
characteristics may be impossible. These criticisms are valid but
not significant. Skyler Ridge does not, as Stark suggests, demand
that the lender's clause employ a "perfect measure of damages."'' 23
Rather, it merely requires a reasonable measure. The difficulty with
the use of the Treasury note index is simply that it invariably over-
states the lender's loss. There could be no objection under Skyler
120. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 507.
121. See, e.g., Gary Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Sun Lodge, Inc., 650 P.2d 1222,
1225 (Ariz. 1982); Idevco, Inc. v. Hobaugh, 571 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990); A-Z Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall, 138 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Mass. 1956) ("Where the
actual damages are easily ascertainable and the stipulated sum is unreasonably and
grossly disproportionate to the real damages from a breach, or is unconscionably exces-
sive, the court will award the aggrieved party no more than his actual damages.").
122. Debra P. Stark, Prepayment Charges in Jeopardy: The Unhappy and Uncertain
Legacy of In re Skyler Ridge, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 191 (1989).
123. Id. at 196.
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Ridge if the lender, for example, constructed its own internal in-
dex-say, a weighted average of interest rates on all commercial
mortgage loans within some range of maturities that it had made
during the most recent calendar month-and based its prepayment
fees on that index. Another possibility would be to determine the
difference between the contract rate and some published rate (such
as ten-year Treasury bonds) as of the date the loan was made, and
to add that difference to the same published rate on the date of the
prepayment. 124 The mechanical problems of applying Skyler Ridge
are not very hard to solve.
Two more recent bankruptcy cases deal with Type III yield
maintenance clauses. The first, In re Kroh Brothers Development
Co. ,125 precisely tracks Skyler Ridge's facts and conclusions. It
holds the clause unenforceable under Missouri law and the fee ineli-
gible for secured status under section 506(b) as well; Skyler Ridge
had discussed but declined to decide the latter point. The second
case, In re Financial Center Associates,126 involved a clause that,
like that in Skyler Ridge, employed a Treasury security reference
rate, but unlike Skyler Ridge provided for discounting of the
lender's lost interest stream to present value. The court held that
even though the formula in the prepayment clause (which produced
a fee of nearly twenty-five percent of the principal being prepaid)
might overestimate the lender's loss, it was good enough to satisfy
the prospective reasonableness test for liquidated damages under
New York law:
There is, and there should be, a wide spectrum of available for-
mulas that are designed to estimate, in any specific case, the pos-
sible actual damages. Actual damages in complicated and
sophisticated transactions do not lose their character as difficult
to ascertain just because formulas may serve as a useful tool to
estimate them. ' 27
The court only cursorily analyzed section 506(b), which it regarded
as a "safety valve which must be used cautiously and sparingly." 128
The borrower had made no effort to prove the extent of the lender's
124. A similar approach was suggested by the borrower's expert witness in First
Nat'l Bank v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, No. 87-2829, 1989 WL 79789 at *10 n.7 (E.D.
Pa. July 10, 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1990). This expert, however, suggested
using the published prime rate rather than the Treasury bond rate. The bond rate seems
preferable, since it is by nature a long-term rate, while the prime represents principally
intermediate-term commercial loans.
125. 88 B.R. 997 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
126. 140 B.R. 829 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
127. Id. at 837.
128. Id. at 839.
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actual loss from prepayment, a failure that the court considered fa-
tal to its reliance on section 506(b). The opinion almost seemed to
take the position that any fee enforceable under state law will con-
stitute a secured claim under section 506(b) as well.
What do all these cases, beginning with United Merchants, sig-
nify in practical terms? First, prepayment fee clauses are fair ob-
jects for attack as invalid penalties in the bankruptcy courts.
Second, the bankruptcy decisions purport to apply state law as an
initial matter; but that statement has little meaning, since in most
jurisdictions the state law of prepayment is unclear. Third, even if
state law is not considered adequate to strike down a prepayment
fee clause, the bankruptcy courts can always reach substantially the
same result by relying on Bankruptcy Code section 506(b), under
which they usually employ an ex ante test of reasonableness.
Although that section technically refers only to allowance of the fee
as a secured claim, as a practical matter denial under section 506(b)
will usually have the effect of giving the lender only a small portion
of the fee or none at all. Fourth, whether operating under state law
or section 506(b), the bankruptcy courts are likely (although not
certain, as Financial Center Associates illustrates) to strike down
prepayment fee clauses that are so constructed as to inevitably
overcompensate lenders (like the Type III-plus clause in Skyler
Ridge) or that appear to impose fees of an arbitrary amount (Type I
and Type 11 clauses) which in fact overcompensate the lender.
Hence, the only sorts of clauses that one can confidently predict will
survive in bankruptcy are Type III "yield maintenance" clauses
that correct the deficiencies of the Skyler Ridge clause, and that
compute the lender's loss with reasonable (although not necessarily
perfect) accuracy.
As of this writing, there seem to be no published non-
bankruptcy cases dealing with Type III yield maintenance prepay-
ment clauses. However, two cases have been decided in a closely
related context-clauses fixing a lender's damages for failure of a
borrower to honor a binding mortgage loan commitment. The anal-
ogy is obvious: a borrower's failure to draw down the loan funds
under a commitment gives the lender precisely the same sort of re-
investment problem as does a prepayment. In a sense, the bor-
rower's breach of the loan commitment is the ultimate prepayment,
one that occurs even before the loan is made.
[V/ol. 40:851
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In the first of these cases, Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n
of America v. Butler,1 29 the language of the damages clause in the
loan commitment was fairly general, giving the lender "all provable
damages, including loss of bargain, sustained by us as a result of
such default."' 30 The court, acting under New York law, fleshed
out this language by awarding the lender the difference between the
contracted interest (14.25%) and interest at the lender's current
loan rate at the time of the breach (12.25%), discounted to present
value. The lender argued that it was entitled to six months of inter-
est differential based on a lower short-term index, on the ground
that it would require that period to find a suitable replacement loan.
The court rejected the argument, noting that the lender had offered
no concrete evidence that it had taken six months to close a replace-
ment loan. The borrower, on the other hand, offered no evidence to
contradict the lender's testimony that 12.25% was its current mort-
gage loan rate, and the court accepted it at face value. In essence, in
computing the lender's damages, the court reached the same result
that it would have reached under a Type III yield maintenance
clause that did not suffer from the sorts of defects criticized by the
Skyler Ridge court. The court used a mortgage rate, rather than a
short-term rate, as an index, and it discounted the differential in
interest to present value. Hence, the decision strongly suggests that
a similar yield maintenance prepayment clause would be upheld.
Another case involving a borrower's breach of a loan commit-
ment, New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Stuzin, 131 in-
volved a more specific and more questionable damages clause. The
clause applied by its terms to both failure of the borrower to draw
down the loan and to prepayment after closing, but the breach was
of the former type. The clause called for a discounting to present
value of the difference between interest at the contract rate and the
equivalent interest at the current yield on U.S. Treasury obligations
of a maturity and coupon rate closest to those of the mortgage loan.
From the Skyler Ridge viewpoint, the use of the Treasury note in-
dex would be objectionable, but the court upheld it under Massa-
chusetts law and enforced the clause, finding it to constitute a
reasonable forecast of damages as of the time the contract was
formed. 132
129. 626 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
130. Id. at 1236.
131. Nos. 86-2470-S, 86-2471-S, 1990 WL 150065 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 1990).
132. The court also sustained language requiring the borrower to reimburse the
lender for its full out-of-pocket expenses in reinvesting the amount prepaid or not
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To date, the only nonbankruptcy case deciding the validity of a
Type 11I yield maintenance clause is an unpublished opinion by the
federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
First National Bank v. Philadelphia National Bank. 133 The court
enforced the clause under Pennsylvania law despite its use of the
yield on Treasury obligations as the reference rate for fixing the pre-
payment fee. The court conceded that "a formula like the lender's
when used industry-wide over a long time tends to give lenders ex-
cessive recoveries."'' 34 Nevertheless, it found that Pennsylvania law
imposed the burden of proving unreasonableness on the party at-
tacking a liquidated damages clause, and it was not satisfied that the
borrowers had sustained their burden by showing that the lender
could readily have reinvested the funds at a rate higher than the
Treasury rate. The court specifically declined to follow Skyler
Ridge, which in effect adopts a contrary presumption.
While New England Mutual Life and First National Bank are
hardly overwhelming authority, they do suggest that a yield mainte-
nance clause will be enforced under state law outside the bank-
ruptcy context, even if the clause seems designed to overstate the
lender's damages systematically. This may not seem surprising in
light of the virtually uniform enforcement of Type I and Type HI
clauses in state courts discussed earlier in this Article. But the sort
of Type III clause found in New England Mutual Life, First Na-
tional Bank, and Skyler Ridge is different because the prepaying
borrower will almost always be forced to overcompensate the
lender. The Type I and Type HI clauses, however, permit a possibil-
ity that the clause will work to the borrower's benefit if interest
rates have fallen so sharply that the lender's loss on prepayment
exceeds the figure dictated by the clause. Whether this difference
warrants a different judicial treatment is the subject of the following
section.
funded. On the facts of the case, which involved refusal by the borrower to take down
the loan, this seems eminently reasonable. In a prepayment case, on the other hand, a
more reasonable technique would require the borrower to reimburse the lender for its
expenses in connection with the old loan, not the reinvestment, and would amortize
even those expenses over the term of the loan. This point is made in the Skyler Ridge
opinion; see 80 B.R. 500, 505 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
133. No. 87-2829, 1989 WL 79789 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 521 (3d
Cir. 1990).
134. Id. at *11.
[Vol. 40:851
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 902 1992-1993
MOR TGA GE PREPA YMENT CLA USES
A. Economic Analysis of the Type III-Plus Clause
A Type III clause is, in a sense, not a liquidated damage clause
at all, but rather a purported formula for computing the lender's
actual damage. However, if the formula used is designed to over-
state the damages (thus, a "Type III-plus" clause, since an addi-
tional liability over and above actual damages is certain to exist),
the Skyler Ridge court, at least, would refuse to enforce it. The
analogy drawn earlier in this Article, treating the prepayment fee
clause as a species of insurance contract, is helpful here. The Type I
or Type II clause is tantamount to insurance, albeit perhaps with a
slightly arbitrary premium. The lender's damages may turn out to
be either more or less than the fee agreed upon, depending on the
subsequent behavior of interest rates; either way, the borrower has
the benefit of knowing that the liability is capped. But with the
Type III clause no insurance function is being served. Instead, the
clause in effect requires the borrower to pay actual damages, and, in
a Type III-plus clause, an additional sum flowing from the clause's
"faults" as outlined above. The borrower would always be better
off with no prepayment clause at all, and instead with the obligation
to pay the lender's actual loss.
The economic analysis of prepayment fees presented earlier in
this Article attempted to justify their enforcement on two grounds:
first, that they represent an efficient voluntary shifting of the risk of
prepayment, and second, that they do not produce inefficiency by
discouraging borrowers' pursuit of lower-interest refinancing. As
noted in the preceding paragraph, the risk-shifting process does not
occur with a Type III clause; the borrower still incurs the entire risk
of loss from prepayment, and in a Type III-plus clause, a further
liability as well. Thus the first rationale suggested earlier for en-
forcement of the clause has no application here. The one advantage
to a Type III-plus clause is its simple formula for computing the fee,
which avoids the need for litigation to measure the mortgagee's
damages.
A "straight" Type III clause that accurately computes the
lender's damages should, of course, be unexceptionable and rou-
tinely upheld. But the case for enforcement of a Type III-plus
clause is obviously weaker. Analyzing the clause according to the
second economic rationale just mentioned reveals that a court
should sustain the clause. The clause does no harm in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency, and whatever sum in excess of actual damages it
forces the borrower to pay the lender is, in practical effect, merely a
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further form of compensation to the lender for having made the
loan.
This is an acceptable situation because, as this Article demon-
strates, no matter how great the apparent overcompensation that
the clause gives the lender, the practical amount of overcompensa-
tion in any voluntary prepayment case will be limited to some por-
tion of present value of the borrower's opportunity to refinance at a
below-market rate. As was shown above, if the borrower must pay
that entire present value or more, she or he will simply forego refi-
nancing altogether; it isn't worth doing. Hence the Type III-plus
clause merely represents a bargain under which the lender exacts a
share of the value of the borrower's below-market refinancing op-
portunity. Although such opportunities are not very common,
when they do exist these clauses force borrowers to "cough up" part
of their value to lenders.
Type III-plus clauses thus result in a cross-subsidization
among borrowers, with those who find attractive below-market refi-
nancing opportunities inevitably subsidizing those who do not. If
Type III-plus clauses were declared unenforceable by all courts,
lenders as a class would forego the revenue these clauses would
otherwise generate, and (assuming an efficient market in mortgage
loans) would raise interest rates or front-end loan fees on all loans
to compensate for that loss. Thus all borrowers would pay a bit
more in order to ease the burden on the select class of borrowers
who have below-market refinancing opportunities. This cross-subsi-
dization seems to have no efficiency implications, nor can it be rea-
sonably attacked on grounds of inequity. Hence, one must
conclude that, at least where prepayment is voluntary, even a Type
III-plus clause should be enforced under state law.
When the borrower is in bankruptcy there is a further factor to
consider. A trustee in bankruptcy or a debtor in possession who
prepays a mortgage loan is representing not merely himself or her-
self, but in most cases a host of subordinate mortgagees and un-
secured creditors as well. If the prepayment fee is allowed as a
secured claim, that much additional value in the security property
will be consumed to pay the fee and hence will be unavailable for
distribution to the unsecured creditors. It is they, not merely the
debtor, who will be harmed by the debtor's poor judgment or im-
providence in entering into an unduly onerous prepayment fee
clause.
If the bankruptcy proceeding is under Chapter 11, there are
additional considerations. Chapter I l's purpose is to save a failing
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business. The managers of firms in Chapter 11 have typically made
many poor business decisions, and signing a mortgage containing a
Type III-plus prepayment clause may have been one of them. But
the goal of Chapter 11 is to help the firm survive for the benefit not
only of its owners but also of its employees, suppliers, creditors, and
all others who do business with it. The very existence of Chapter 11
in the Bankruptcy Code reflects a federal policy decision that this
goal is sufficiently important to warrant modification of some of the
contractual rights of some of these parties in order to benefit all of
them in the aggregate. The goal may be debatable, but it is so
firmly entrenched in American law that any debate is not of much
interest.
Whether these objectives of bankruptcy are sufficient to war-
rant a bankruptcy court's disallowance of a Type I or Type II fee is
doubtful. As noted earlier, those fees are a type of insurance pre-
mium. The premium may have been too high, and the debtor may
have been foolish to have agreed to it, but it was at least potentially
less than the lender's actual damages, and it did avoid the necessity
of litigation to establish those damages. Bankruptcy courts should
not engage in a post hoc re-evaluation of the debtor's insurance poli-
cies, refusing to pay the premiums already due on those that appear
burdensome. Except in the most extreme cases involving fees at
outrageous levels, the bankruptcy courts ought to let Type I and
Type II fees stand under section 506(b).
But with a Type III-plus clause-one that is consciously
designed to overstate the lender's damages in every instance-a
much stronger argument for bankruptcy court intervention can be
made. When the borrower is in bankruptcy, the debtor's transfer of
wealth under the prepayment fee clause ultimately diminishes the
junior lienholders and unsecured creditors, and in Chapter 11 the
employees, suppliers, and other contractors. In theory, they might
have gone to the public records, reviewed the clause in the mort-
gage, and made their business decisions accordingly, but the trans-
action costs of this behavior would obviously be far in excess of its
benefits in most cases, and it is wholly impractical to expect ordi-
nary trade creditors, for example, to engage in it. Hence, they are
entitled to a restoration to the bankruptcy estate of the unearned fee
charged by the mortgage lender. 3 5 It is one thing for unsecured
135. A rough analogy can be drawn to the fraudulent transfer concept of § 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the court to set aside transfers given by an
insolvent debtor within one year of bankruptcy for less than "reasonably equivalent
value." 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Of course, the prepayment fee is not,
1993]
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creditors to live with a business decision of the debtor that was po-
tentially an unnecessary and unearned expense; it is another to im-
pose upon them a decision that was inevitably such an expense. The
bankruptcy courts may reasonably conclude that the debtor can
throw away his or her own money, but not money owed to the
subordinate and unsecured creditors. Hence, the economic freedom
ordinarily allowed to borrowers can properly be curtailed to serve
the policy objectives of bankruptcy.
On the other hand, a bankruptcy court's refusal to allow the
full prepayment fee as a secured claim under either state law or
section 506(b) should not mean that the lender gets no fee at all.
Although some bankruptcy cases have reached this result, it is le-
gally unnecessary and unfair to the lender if an actual loss exists.
Ordinarily under state law, denial of enforcement of a liquidated
damages clause leaves the party who suffered the breach with a
claim for actual damages. 136 Similarly, section 506(b) states that
reasonable fees "shall be allowed." 137 Unless a court wants to pun-
ish the lender for being a pig, it ought to take evidence of the
lender's actual damages and allow them as a secured claim.
In general, then, the courts are doing just what ought to be
done with clauses imposing fees for voluntary prepayment. They
enforce them routinely, regardless of their amount, except when the
borrower is in bankruptcy and the clause is designed to accomplish
a systematic overcompensation of the lender. Principles of eco-
nomic efficiency support the results actually being reached.
V. THE INTERACTION OF PREPAYMENT AND
ACCELERATION CLAUSES
Virtually all commercial mortgages contain clauses providing
for acceleration of the debt under certain circumstances. The most
universal of these clauses permits the lender to accelerate the loan,
making the entire balance immediately due and payable, in the
event of a default by the borrower in payment or in performance of
other covenants.' 38 At least three other types of events are com-
in most cases, amenable to literal treatment under § 548; the one-year time period will
usually have expired, and the debtor may not have been insolvent when the mortgage
was executed. Nevertheless, a Type III-plus clause can readily be considered a transfer
for less than reasonably equivalent value, a fact that lends weight to a court's disallow-
ance of the fee under § 506(b).
136. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
138. The documents may provide for a notice to the borrower of the nature of the
default, and a brief grace period within which the default may be cured, prior to acceler-
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monly made grounds for debt acceleration. One is the occurrence
of insured physical damage to the improvements on the real estate.
While some residential loan clauses may allow the mortgagor to ap-
ply the insurance proceeds to repair the damage, 139 most commer-
cial mortgages give the lender the option to apply the entire
proceeds against the debt instead. 140 Another is a taking of the
property by eminent domain; a mortgage clause will usually provide
that the entire governmental award will, at the lender's option, be
applied toward the mortgage balance. 141 A third basis for accelera-
tion is a transfer of the security property, which can trigger an ac-
celeration under a due-on-sale clause. 142
When acceleration occurs in any of these four situations, the
lender requires the borrower to make a prepayment (in whole or in
part) of the debt. The lender may compel payment by action on the
debt, foreclosure, suit for a deficiency, or some combination of
these. The lender will often demand, in addition, any prepayment
fee provided for in the mortgage documents. Borrowers naturally
resist the collection of the fee, often arguing that because the pre-
payment is involuntary, the fee clause does not apply. The follow-
ing material will examine whether, in each of these four prepayment
cases, the fee should be collectible.
ation. See, e.g., FNMA/FHLMC MORTGAGE, SINGLE FAMILY, Nonuniform Cove-
nant 21 (Sept. 1990), which grants a 30-day period to cure; NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 1, §§ 7.6-7.8.
139. See, e.g., FNMA/FHLMC MORTGAGE, SINGLE FAMILY, Uniform Covenant 5
(Sept. 1990), which permits the borrower to apply the insurance proceeds to repair or
restore if such is economically feasible and the lender's security is not lessened.
140. See, e.g., FNMA/FHLMC UNIFORM INSTRUMENT, MULTIFAMILY DEED OF
TRUST, Uniform Covenant 5 (Jan. 1977), which authorizes the lender, at its sole option,
to hold insurance proceeds for reconstruction of the property or to apply them toward
payment of the balance owing on the debt.
141. See, e.g., id. Uniform Covenant 11. If only a partial taking occurs, the clause
may provide that less than the entire award must be paid on the debt. See also, e.g.,
FNMA/FHLMC MORTGAGE, SINGLE FAMILY, Uniform Covenant 10 (Sept. 1990),
which requires payment of only a fraction of the award, defined as (a) the loan balance
immediately prior to the taking, divided by (b) the fair market value of the property
immediately prior to the taking. The objective, of course, is to maintain the loan-to-
value ratio that the lender enjoyed before the taking, but to allow the borrower to have
the funds not needed by the lender for this purpose. It is doubtful that many mortgages
on commercial real estate make even this concession to the borrower.
142. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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A. Contract Construction: Is Acceleration Governed by the
Prepayment Clause?
Prior to the mid-1980s, it was rare for the prepayment clauses
in commercial mortgages to deal specifically with prepayment inci-
dent to acceleration. Hence, lenders who claimed prepayment fees
upon acceleration had only a slender contractual basis for doing so.
They could argue that the loan was indeed being paid prior to its
scheduled maturity and hence that the fee had been earned, but
they could point to no contract language so stating. They usually
lost these cases, typically on the grounds that the clause was not
intended to cover "involuntary" prepayments; 143 having been accel-
erated by the lender, the loan was now mature, and thus that pay-
ment was not "pre-" in the sense of being in advance of maturity,144
or that the lender's acceleration constituted a waiver of the prepay-
ment fee. 145
143. For cases involving acceleration for default, see In re Planvest Equity Income
Partners IV, 94 B.R. 644, 645 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988); Kilpatrick v. Germania Life Ins.
Co., 75 N.E. 1124, 1125 (N.Y. 1905); 3C Assocs. v. IC & LP Realty Co., 524 N.Y.S.2d
701, 701-02 (App. Div. 1988); George H. Nutman, Inc. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,
453 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
For a case involving payment from proceeds of a hazard insurance policy, see
Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers Bond & Mortg. Co., 149 A.2d 48, 50 (Pa. 1959).
For cases involving payment from proceeds of an eminent domain action, see Asso-
ciated Schs., Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489, 489-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Village of Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, 501 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986); Jala Corp. v. Berkeley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 250 A.2d 150, 154 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1969); Silverman v. State, 370 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (App. Div. 1975); see also
Dekalb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 219 S.E.2d 707, 710 (Ga. 1975) (prepay-
ment fee is not a compensable element of damage in eminent domain action).
144. For cases involving acceleration for default, see Eyde Bros. Dev. Co. v. Equita-
ble Life Assur. Soc'y, 697 F. Supp. 1431, 1436 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 127
(6th Cir. 1989); McCarthy v. Louisiana Timeshare Venture, 426 So. 2d 1342, 1346 (La.
Ct. App. 1982); Ferreira v. Yared, 588 N.E.2d 1370, 1371 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977);
Rodgers v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 757 P.2d 976, 978 (Wash. 1988).
For cases involving acceleration under a due-on-sale clause, see Tan v. California
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (Ct. App. 1983); Slevin Container
Corp. v. Provident Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 424 N.E.2d 939, 940-41 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981); American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mid-America Serv. Corp., 329 N.W.2d 124,
126 (S.D. 1983); cf. Metropolitan Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Naburs, 652 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983) (enforcement denied on ground that clauses constituted a restraint on
alienation).
145. For cases involving acceleration for default, see In re LHD Realty Corp., 726
F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1984); 3C Assocs., 524 N.Y.S.2d at 702; George H. Nutman,
Inc. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. 1982). But see Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hilander, 403 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1966) (lender does not waive right to
prepayment fee merely by threatening acceleration).
For a case involving acceleration under a due-on-sale clause, see McCausland v.
Bankers Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 941, 946 (Wash. 1988) ("It is only fair that the lender be
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These cases were not free of conceptual difficulty. For exam-
ple, a problem was raised when the borrower prepaid under the
threat or prospect of acceleration for default or under a due-on-sale
clause, even though no formal notice of acceleration had been given
by the lender. The courts, perhaps wishing to avoid the need to
delineate the various gradations of expectation of acceleration that
might exist in borrowers' minds, usually held that only payment
under an actual acceleration was free of the duty to pay the fee. 146
Another problem was created by borrowers who were tempted to
engage in conduct that would cause their lenders to accelerate, pre-
cisely in order to prepay while avoiding the fee that would ordina-
rily be due on a voluntary acceleration. Hazard insurance payoffs
and eminent domain awards do not, as a practical matter, present
this sort of opportunity to borrowers, but defaults and sales of the
property plainly do. After some equivocal language in the earlier
cases, 147 the courts finally began to announce rather forcefully that
prohibited from demanding prepayment fees upon acceleration of the debt since.., it is
the lender who is insisting on prepayment.").
See also Greenhouse Patio Apartments v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 153 (5th
Cir. 1989), in which the lender, in order to protect its claim to the prepayment fee under
the cases cited above, went to great and successful lengths not to accelerate the debt.
146. For cases concerning acceleration for default, see In re Adu-Kofi, 94 B.R. 14,
15 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988) (lender may rescind acceleration unless borrower has relied to
its detriment, and prepayment after rescission requires payment of fee); Bell Bakeries,
Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 96 S.E.2d 408, 417 (N.C. 1957); West Portland
Dev. Co. v. Ward Cook, Inc., 424 P.2d 212, 214 (Or. 1967) (lender accelerated because
of the borrower's default, but subsequently rescinded the acceleration at the borrower's
request; borrower then prepaid the loan; held: since the acceleration was no longer in
effect, the lender was permitted to collect the prepayment fee); Berenato v. Bell Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 419 A.2d 620, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (same).
For cases involving acceleration under a due-on-sale clause, see First Nat'l Bank v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 510 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); First Ind. Fed.
Say. Bank v. Maryland Dev. Co., 509 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (where
lender had refused to approve sale of property, but had not accelerated under due-on-
sale clause, lender could demand prepayment fee when loan was prepaid; the prepay-
ment was not "involuntary"). But see Wide Scope, Inc. v. Freedom Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 520 N.E.2d 35 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. Ohio 1987) (lender was barred from
collection of prepayment fee, where lender told borrower that it would not approve
transfer of mortgaged property, despite fact that lender had not instituted foreclosure
proceedings and apparently had not accelerated).
147. See, e.g., LHD Realty, 726 F.2d at 331 ("[S]hould such intentional defaults
become a problem .... courts could [deny] the acceleration exception in appropriate
cases."). See also the dicta in Eyde Bros., 697 F. Supp. at 1436, and Rodgers, 757 P.2d
at 978-79, both of which imply that an intentional default would permit collection of
the fee.
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such bad faith actions by borrowers would simply fail to gain the
desired result; the prepayment fee would have to be paid. 148
I have described these cases in the past tense, although many of
them are recent, because they are shortly destined to become largely
irrelevant as a result of changes that have already occurred in com-
mercial mortgage practice. Lenders' counsel followed with acute
interest the development of the case law denying prepayment fees to
borrowers whose payments were a result of acceleration of the debt.
By the mid-1980s they were busy redrafting their mortgages to
make their clients' contractual right to prepayment fees in these cir-
cumstances very clear. The 1988 FNMA/FHLMC Rider to Multi-
family Instrument is illustrative:
Borrower shall pay the prepayment premium ... whether
the prepayment is voluntary or involuntary (in connection with
Lender's acceleration of the unpaid principal balance of the
Note) or the Instrument is satisfied or released by foreclosure
.... deed in lieu of foreclosure or by any other means. Borrower
shall not pay any prepayment premium with respect to any pre-
payment occurring as a result of the application of insurance pro-
ceeds or condemnation awards under the Instrument.149
The clauses that many commercial lenders currently use do not ex-
clude insurance and condemnation awards, as does the FNMA/
FHLMC form; instead, they state that all payments prior to sched-
uled maturity will give rise to prepayment fee liability. Thus far,
these clauses are having precisely their desired effect; the courts are
enforcing them literally.150
148. Florida Nat'l Bank v. BankAtlantic, 589 So. 2d 255, 259 (Fla. 1991). The line
between a default intended to induce an acceleration and a default caused by the bor-
rower's financial problems is not an easy one to draw. Borrowers who engage in alleged
"bad faith" defaults are often in financial distress as well; indeed, it is usually their hope
that an acceleration by the lender will permit them to pay off the loan (without a pre-
payment fee, of course) and to refinance at a lower interest rate, thus improving the
project's cash flow and placing it in a financially viable posture. See id. at 259 (Grimes,
J., dissenting).
149. FNMA/FHLMC RIDER TO MULTIFAMILY INSTRUMENT, COVENANT A(3)
(Apr. 1988). Very similar language was employed by Connecticut General Life Insur-
ance Co. in the loan litigated in In re Schaumburg Hotel Owner Ltd. Partnership, 97
B.R. 943, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). Perhaps the earliest similar language discussed
in a reported case (albeit not involving a mortgage loan) is found in In re United
Merchants & Mfrs., 674 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1982): "upon default: then at the option
of the holder of any Note... the principal of such Note shall forthwith become due and
payable, together with the interest accrued thereon, and, to the extent permitted by law,
an amount equal to the pre-payment charge that would be payable if [borrower] were
prepaying such Note at the time."
150. At this point most of the cases involve acceleration for default, rather than
under a due-on-sale clause. See Schaumburg Hotel, 97 B.R. at 953 ("Because this right
was specifically bargained for and agreed to by the Debtor, [the lender] is entitled to
[Vol. 40:851
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B. An Economic Analysis of Prepayment Resulting from
Acceleration
This Article has described the prepayment clause as a form of
insurance, permitting the borrower (for a fee) to shift the financial
risk of prepayment to the lender. I now propose to use this insur-
ance model to evaluate prepayments that result from acceleration
by the lender. The analysis is vitally dependent on a clear definition
of the "insured event"-that is, the occurrence for which the pre-
payment fee is designed to compensate. As I have already argued,
that event is prepayment resulting from the borrower's actions 151 or
from other causes beyond the lender's control. If a prepayment is
the lender's "fault"-that is, if it is triggered by a lender who has no
legitimate need to demand it to protect the security or to avoid de-
fault, it is not the sort of prepayment against which the parties in-
tended to insure.
The familiar insurance law principle of "moral hazard" ex-
plains this conclusion. That phrase typically describes situations in
which the insured party is tempted, because of the existence of the
insurance coverage, to reduce the degree of care that he or she
would otherwise take to prevent the occurrence of the insured
event. For example, the insured under a fire insurance policy may
enforce its liquidated damages clause."); see also Parker Plaza West Partners v. UNUM
Pension & Ins Co., 941 F.2d 349, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1991); United Merchants, 674 F.2d
at 143; In re Financial Center Assocs., 140 B.R. 829, 835 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992);
Golden Forest Properties v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. Rptr. 316, 318-19
(Ct. App. 1988); Meisler v. Republic Sav. Ass'n, 758 S.W.2d 878, 884 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
Warrington 611 Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 229 (D.N.J. 1989),
upheld in dictum a combination of prepayment and due-on-sale clauses. However, the
loan was in fact locked in and nonprepayable at the time of the proposed sale of the
property, and the lender did not actually accelerate the loan, but merely indicated that
it would demand a yield maintenance fee if the loan were paid off in connection with the
sale. The court held that the lender's position was warranted and gave rise to no liabil-
ity for damages. Id. at 236. The due-on-sale clause was largely irrelevant, as the bor-
rower desired to pay off the loan.
The enforceability of mortgage language specifically imposing a prepayment fee
upon an acceleration by the lender was predicted in dictum in several additional cases.
See Eyde Bros., 697 F. Supp. at 1436 ("If parties to a contract wish to avoid the general
rule of LHD Realty, it is incumbent upon them to more clearly express their intent in
their agreement."); Village of Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, 501 N.E.2d
859, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (eminent domain award); Rodgers, 757 P.2d at 979 (accel-
eration for default).
The only decision refusing to enforce specific mortgage language providing for col-
lection of a prepayment fee upon an acceleration for default is Clinton Capital Corp. v.
Straeb, 589 A.2d 1363 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990), discussed infra notes 178-179
and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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pay less attention to the presence of flammable chemicals or other
combustible materials on the premises, thinking, "Why worry? I'm
covered by insurance anyway." The most extreme form of moral
hazard is the situation in which the insured has full control over the
insured event. The whole point of insurance is to shift the risk of
events that are outside the beneficiary's control. Both the drafters
of insurance policies and the courts go to great lengths to prevent
enforcement of insurance claims when the beneficiary causes or con-
trols the loss. 152 Thus, for example, the beneficiary under a life in-
surance policy cannot collect if he or she murders the insured; the
insured under a fire insurance policy who bums down his or her
own house is not entitled to make a claim; and so on. There is a
good economic reason for this restriction: insurance is efficient be-
cause it permits shifting risk from one who is more risk-averse to
one who is less risk-averse. This principle is inapplicable when the
party who is shifting away the risk has control of whether a loss will
eventuate. A contract of this sort is not insurance at all. It is
merely an agreement to transfer wealth from the insurer to the in-
sured upon demand.
In some contexts a mortgage clause providing for a prepay-
ment fee upon acceleration takes on the characteristics of an insur-
ance contract in which the insured (the mortgagee) controls
whether or not the insured event will occur. In the mortgage con-
tract there is an additional feature: as a precursor to acceleration,
some triggering action must occur. That trigger-a governmental
taking, a casualty loss, or a transfer of the property-is itself outside
the mortgagee's control. But under some conditions the triggering
occurrence may impose no cost or risk on the lender. When an
occurrence gives rise to no business or economic necessity for the
lender to accelerate, it is a mere fortuity. Under such circum-
stances, the lender's decision to accelerate actuates the "moral haz-
ard" principle discussed above, and the lender should, in insurance
terms, be "denied coverage." It is as if no insured event has oc-
curred. Because the "insurance" contract represented by the pre-
payment fee clause has the peculiar feature that the "premium" (the
fee) is not due from the mortgagor until an insured event occurs, it
should not be payable under these circumstances. Indeed, to en-
force the prepayment fee when there is no business necessity for the
prepayment is analogous to enforcement of a gambling contract. In
152. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THE-
ORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14-15, 35-36 (1986); ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTAND-
ING INSURANCE LAW 300-03 (1987).
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substance, the mortgagee says, "If a triggering occurrence, such as a
taking, a casualty loss, or a sale of the property occurs, it may or
may not affect my position in terms of security and credit risk. But
even if it does not affect me in those ways, I still have the right to
accelerate, and to charge you, the borrower, a prepayment fee."
There is no economic or public policy rationale for enforcement of
the fee in these conditions.
The description of moral hazard above does not apply to all
accelerations resulting from condemnation, casualty loss, or prop-
erty sale. In many cases the lender has a legitimate business need to
accelerate when one of these events occurs. In those cases, the pre-
payment fee, if provided in the mortgage documents, should be
readily enforced. Hence, we need to examine carefully each of the
common events that triggers mortgage acceleration, and to consider
when each of those events gives the lender a business need to accel-
erate. I will begin with the easiest case, acceleration resulting from
eminent domain takings, and proceed to the case that I regard as
the most difficult, acceleration for default.
1. Takings in Eminent Domain
When the mortgaged property is taken in eminent domain, the
lender's security is either entirely lost (in a total taking) or reduced
in value (in a partial taking). In either case, both the common law
and most commercial mortgages give the lender the right to insist
that the award be applied toward the debt.1 53 In the case of a total
taking the judicial rule allots the entire award (up to the amount of
the debt) to the lender. When only part of the land is taken, some
cases give the lender the entire award, but most of the modem deci-
sions allocate to the lender, for payment toward the debt, only so
much of the award as is necessary to maintain the loan-to-value
ratio that existed before the taking. This approach is seen as
preventing impairment of the lender's security, while at the same
time preserving as much of the loan principal as possible for the
borrower's use. 154
153. See Hatch v. Minot, 369 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 4.12 (pointing out that in partial taking cases the authorities
are divided between giving the mortgagee the entire award and giving it only enough to
protect its security); Harold D. Teague, Condemnation of Mortgaged Property, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1966).
154. See Pima County v. INA/Oldfather 4.7 Acres Trust #2292, 700 P.2d 877, 879
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Redwood Baseline, Ltd., 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 16 (Ct.
App. 1978); Investors Syndicate v. Dade County, 98 So. 2d 889, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); Harwell v. Georgia Power Co., 298 S.E.2d 498, 498 (Ga. 1983); First W.
19931
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The cases disagree as to whether language in the mortgage doc-
uments can effectively override the majority rule preserving the
loan-to-value ratio and give the lender a claim for the entire award
in a partial taking case.155 The courts that permit this contractual
modification of the judicial rule allow the eminent domain clause to
act as a peculiar sort of due-on-sale clause, with the "sale" in ques-
tion being the governmental taking. Since such takings are rela-
tively rare and are usually unpredictable at the time the loan is
made, it is doubtful that such a clause, even if enforceable, has
much economic value to the lender. Indeed, language in the mort-
gage may take an even more heavy-handed approach, authorizing
an acceleration of the entire debt (and not merely the amount of the
condemnation award) when a partial taking occurs. But this lan-
guage may be too much for a court to swallow. In Sessler v. Arshak
Corp.,156 the Florida District Court of Appeal dealt with such a
clause in a foreclosure action triggered by the taking in eminent
domain of such a small portion of the property that its security
value was not impaired. The court refused to recognize the acceler-
ation or to order foreclosure, holding that to do so would be "ineq-
uitable and unjust."
Now consider a mortgage that provides for a prepayment fee
when a paydown of the debt of the sort described above occurs. If
the paydown is really necessary to protect the lender's security after
a governmental taking, and if the mortgage documents clearly state
that the prepayment fee is chargeable in these circumstances, the
courts should enforce that language. The risk of a necessary pre-
payment resulting from eminent domain is one of the risks the par-
ties agreed to cover under the clause, and it is efficient (as discussed
earlier) to give effect to their agreement. The government's decision
to engage in a taking under its power of eminent domain is ordina-
rily a "neutral" occurrence because the lender has no influence.
There need be no concern that the lender will attempt to manipulate
Fin. Corp. v. Vegas Continental, 692 P.2d 1279, 1281-82 (Nev. 1984); FDIC v. Texas
Elec. Serv. Co., 723 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). Other approaches, not
widely used, are discussed in Teague, supra note 153, at 1549-52.
155. Compare INA/Oldfather, 700 P.2d at 879 ("[W]hen the deed of trust or mort-
gage has a provision determining the disposition of such proceeds, it governs.") with
Redwood Baseline, 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 16 n.7 (construing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1265.225 to mean that a "lienholder is entitled to share in the award only to the extent
of the impairment of his security notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary en-
tered into at the time of the creation of the indebtedness on which the lien is based").
156. 464 So. 2d 612, 612-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (only a small portion of the
property was taken, and security was not impaired; hence, foreclosure would be "ineq-
uitable and unjust").
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the matter in order to collect an unwarranted prepayment fee.
Lenders will naturally and correctly point out that a prepayment
resulting from a governmental taking imposes on the lender pre-
cisely the same burden and potential financial loss as the borrower's
voluntary prepayment.
However, the paydown of the mortgage may not be necessary
for protection of the lender's security. Obviously the real estate or
some portion of it is gone and can no longer serve as security. But if
the lender demands and can enforce a paydown that does not
merely maintain, but actually improves, its loan-to-value ratio, the
excess portion of that paydown above that necessary to maintain
the ratio is ordinarily unnecessary for protection of the security.
Moreover, a paydown or payoff may be unnecessary even in the
case of a total taking of the real estate. Suppose the mortgagor asks
the lender to leave the full loan outstanding and offers to substitute
collateral-say, an unconditional letter of credit from a bank of
great financial strength-that is indisputably as good or better se-
curity than the real estate, and further offers to pay all transaction
costs associated with the substitution. Further assume that the
mortgagor has sources of cashfiow sufficient to cover the debt ser-
vice payments, so that the loss of the real estate as a cash generator
will not increase the risk of default. Under these circumstances, the
mortgagor might well argue, by analogy to Sessler v. Arshak
Corp. ,'17 that the security has not been impaired and that no accel-
eration of the debt should be recognized. Professor Frank Alexan-
der has advanced this argument, 158 and it has considerable force,
although no court seems yet to have adopted it.
Thus, a court might reject the mortgagor's offer of substitute
collateral as a basis for denying acceleration of the loan. But even if
the acceleration is enforced, the mortgagor's offer should suffice to
establish that the prepayment which ensues is not attributable to the
borrower, but rather to the lender. If the mortgagor makes the offer
of substitution and the lender rejects it, it is the lender's "fault" that
prepayment occurs. Even if the substitution is a fully adequate re-
placement for the real estate, the lender might object if he or she
desires repayment because the combination of the prepayment fee
and the value of relending the funds at market interest rates exceed-
ing the contract rate on the existing loan make the prepayment
157. 464 So. 2d 612.
158. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 320.
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profitable. The lender's calculation (ignoring transaction costs) is a
simple one:
* The amount of the condemnation award (potentially to be
prepaid);
* Plus the prepayment fee;
* Minus the future stream of payments the lender will earn on
the amount of the condemnation award, discounted to present
value at the current market rate.
If the sum of these factors is positive, the lender will be better off
financially to insist on prepayment of the condemnation award,
even if it has no need to do so in terms of protection of its security
because the borrower has offered fully adequate substitute security.
On these facts, the lender's actions are the sole cause of the prepay-
ment. It is outside the scope of "insured events" which the prepay-
ment fee clause covers, and no fee should be awarded. Perhaps
cases in which a condemnee/mortgagor can and will offer such sat-
isfactory substitute security will not be very common, but where
they occur the courts should refuse to enforce the prepayment fee
even if they permit the prepayment itself. The same reasoning
should be followed in partial taking cases in which the courts allot
to the lender so much of the condemnation award that the lender's
loan-to-value ratio is improved; no prepayment fee should be col-
lectible on the excess portion of the allotment.
2. Hazard Insurance Proceeds and Due-on-Sale Accelerations
Prepayments of hazard insurance proceeds are much the same
as those resulting from government condemnation actions, but with
one important difference. When the real estate has been damaged
by a fire or other insured hazard, application of the insurance pro-
ceeds will frequently restore the damage. Often the borrower will
prefer this use of the insurance proceeds, since the borrower needs
the property in a useable state, and the only alternative means of
financing a restoration may be by means of a subordinate mortgage
loan at a relatively high interest rate. But the lender may have an
incentive to discourage use of the insurance proceeds to restore the
premises. If its mortgage permits it to demand that the insurance
proceeds be applied on the debt, the lender may look at current
interest rates and conclude that prepayment is financially advanta-
geous despite the fact that restoration of the damaged real estate
could readily be accomplished with the insurance proceeds and that
after restoration the premises would be as acceptable security as
before the damage occurred. If the mortgage also provides for an
enforceable prepayment fee, the lender's incentive to capture the in-
[Vol. 40:851
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surance payment is stronger yet. The lender's calculation is analo-
gous to that used above to analyze the capture of eminent domain
awards:
* The amount of the hazard insurance proceeds (potentially to
be prepaid);
* Plus the prepayment fee;
* Minus the future stream of payments the lender will earn on
the amount of the insurance proceeds, discounted to present
value at the current market rate.
If the sum of these factors is positive, it will be to the lender's ad-
vantage to insist on prepayment of the insurance funds although it
has no need to do so for protection of its security. 159 While the
California courts have refused to countenance this result even if the
mortgage purports to give the lender the right to insist upon it,160
virtually all other jurisdictions routinely enforce such mortgage
clauses, and most hold for the lender even if there is no clause. 161
Prepayment caused by an acceleration under a due-on-sale
clause is analogous to that under a casualty insurance clause. Due-
on-sale clauses are designed to address two distinct issues. The first
is the risk that the real estate will be transferred to someone who
has a weak credit history, an inadequate income to carry the mort-
gage debt service, a history of "milking" or committing waste on
159. This sort of calculation and decision is by no means hypothetical. It is quite
clear that the mortgagees went through precisely this process (and hence demanded
prepayment) in Starkman v. Sigmond, 446 A.2d 1249 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
No prepayment fee was involved in the case, but because market interest rates had risen
significantly since the loan was made, the mortgagees were still better off with a prepay-
ment of the insurance proceeds.
160. See Kreshek v. Sperling, 204 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1984); Schoolcraft v.
Ross, 146 Cal. Rtpr. 57 (Ct. App. 1978). Where the mortgage does not explicitly give
the mortgagee control of the insurance proceeds, some additional jurisdictions have rec-
ognized the mortgagor's right to use them for restoration of the premises. See Cottman
Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 182 A. 551, 554-55 (Md. 1936); Starkman, 446 A.2d at
1253.
161. See, e.g., Pearson v. First Nat'l Bank, 408 N.E.2d 166, 169-70 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (lender breached no duty to borrower by applying proceeds to mortgage debt);
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1983); see also NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 1, § 4.15. In General G.M.C. Sales, Inc. v. Passarella, 481 A.2d 307 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), the court held that the lender may capture insurance pro-
ceeds in absence of a mortgage clause, and disagreed with Starkman, 446 A.2d 1249:
There may be cases in which the mortgagee will be adequately protected
by a holding that allows the mortgagor to use the fire insurance proceeds
to rebuild. But there will be times when the mortgagee will be placed at
risk by having his mortgage on an existing building converted to a con-
struction mortgage for a new building. The holding creates too much
potential for dispute and litigation.
General G.M.C. Sales, 481 A.2d at 312.
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real estate, or who for some other reason is an objectively unaccept-
able borrower. In effect, the due-on-sale clause permits the lender
to say, "If this proposed grantee of the property lacks the personal
and financial qualities that we would find acceptable in a new bor-
rower, we don't have to permit him or her to take the property
subject to our mortgage loan." Even prior to the Gan Act, the
courts universally agreed that this use of the due-on-sale clause was
legitimate. 162
The second function of the clause has nothing to do with the
qualifications of the proposed purchaser of the real estate. It is to
give the lender an opportunity to adjust the yield on its mortgage
loan portfolio upward, taking advantage of increased interest rates
since the loan was initially made. Prior to passage of the Garn Act,
this use of the clause was controversial, but the Garn Act legiti-
mized it.163
The analogy between the eminent domain and insurance
clauses and the due-on-sale clause should now be clear. All of these
clauses may have two possible objectives: first, to protect the lender
against unacceptable risks of default and loss (in the insurance and
eminent domain cases, flowing from a loss in value of the security,
and in the due-on-sale case, flowing from the substitution of a bor-
rower of unacceptable quality); and second, to give the lender an
opportunity to raise its portfolio yield in a period of rising rates. If,
under applicable law and mortgage language, the lender can enforce
the due-on-sale clause and also insist on collection of a prepayment
fee, the lender's decision whether to do so (assuming that the pro-
posed purchaser of the real estate is acceptable) will be based on
precisely the same sort of calculation given above in connection
with condemnation and hazard insurance proceeds:
* The loan balance;
* Plus the prepayment fee;
* Minus the future stream of payments the lender would earn on
the existing loan, discounted to present value at the current
market rate.
If the result is positive, the lender has an incentive to accelerate the
loan and collect the fee.
Under what conditions should the prepayment fee be collecti-
ble? If we think of the prepayment fee clause as a device for shifting
risk to the lender in return for the borrower's payment to the lender
of a prepayment fee that represents an "insurance premium," the
162. See sources cited supra note 3.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
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question becomes: What risks are being insured? In mortgages in
which the prepayment fee clearly applies to accelerations based on
hazard insurance payments and due-on-sale accelerations, the risks
of default and loss that are caused by irremediable reductions in
value due to eminent domain, fire, or other casualty, or by the sub-
stitution of a property owner with poor credit-worthiness are pre-
cisely within the ambit of the prepayment clause. In essence,
takings, casualty losses, and property transfers may change the loan
equation in ways that may be detrimental to the lender, and if they
are detrimental, the lender need not accept them. Hence the lender
is entitled to demand a payoff. And because that payoff will force
the lender to seek reinvestment opportunities, with their attendant
cost and risk of rate loss, the lender should be fully empowered to
collect the prepayment fee that represents the value, as agreed by
the parties, of the lender's absorption of that risk of loss.
Consider, however, an eminent domain taking in which the se-
curity is preserved or a fully acceptable substitute is provided, a fire
or other casualty loss that can readily be restored by expenditure of
the insurance proceeds, or a sale to a new owner whose credit, in-
come, and other qualities are at least as acceptable as the original
borrower's. In these circumstances, the lender's sole purpose in ac-
celerating the loan is to improve the yield on its mortgage portfolio.
There may be nothing wrong with that; the Garn Act establishes
the lender's right to accelerate upon a sale of the property, and ac-
celeration upon eminent domain or casualty is at least arguably per-
missible, with the caveats expressed earlier. The question is
whether the prepayment fee should also be collectible. On these
facts, I suggest that it should not be because it is a pure windfall to
the lender, consequently reducing the clause to a mere gambling
contract. Under the circumstances stated at the beginning of this
paragraph, if there is no prepayment fee the lender will accelerate
only when the market rate is higher than the loan's contract rate.
The existence of an enforceable prepayment fee, however, may give
the lender an incentive to accelerate even if current market rates are
equal to or lower than the contract rate. In this situation, payoff of
the loan is unnecessary either to protect the lender's security or to
permit it to take advantage of increased market rates-the two le-
gitimate purposes of the hazard insurance and due-on-sale
clauses. 164
164. The Washington Supreme Court expressed this proposition well in McCaus-
land v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 941, 946 (Wash. 1988) (emphasis added):
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Of course, it can be argued that the clause compels a wealth
transfer from borrower to lender, one bargained for at the inception
of the loan. The feature that makes it objectionable, however, is its
fortuitous character. The clause does not merely have the lender
say, "Borrower, if you suffer a taking or fire, or sell your property,
you must protect me from security loss"; nor does it merely say, "if
you suffer a taking or a fire, or sell your property, I am entitled to
realize on market rate increases." Rather it says, "If you suffer a
taking or a fire, or sell your property, you must pay me a windfall
profit, even if your actions have caused me no harm and I have lost
no financial opportunity."' 165 The lender who accelerates when
there is no harm to its security and no increased risk of default does
so only because it expects to gain rather than lose by reinvesting the
funds. Such a lender has not experienced the "insured event" that
makes the prepayment fee due.
Enforcing the prepayment fee incident to a sale of the property
raises an additional policy objection, for it may actually prevent the
sale from occurring. The buyer and seller must together share the
cost of paying the fee to the lender, and the fee may be large enough
to discourage the transaction. When the fee acts to compensate the
lender for a genuine risk, a situation that only arises when the pro-
posed buyer's credit or other qualities are objectionable, it is legiti-
mate. As we have already seen, it is not the amount of the fee that
determines this legitimacy, but the nature of the risk that it is in-
tended to compensate; hence, a fee that exceeds the dollar amount
If a lender elects to accelerate the debt upon sale because interest rates
have increased, the lender should not also be allowed to collect a prepay-
ment fee. The function of the prepayment fee or prohibition is to protect
lenders from borrower refinancing in times of falling interest rates and
should not be used to penalize borrowers who refuse to accept lender's
increased interest rates at resale in times of rising rates. It is only fair
that the lender be prohibited from demanding prepayment fees upon ac-
celeration of the debt since, in that instance, it is the lender who is insist-
ing on prepayment.
See also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 6.5.
165. The situation is analogous to the "insurable interest" requirement of insurance
law, which holds that one may not insure property in which one has no ownership
rights. See JERRY, supra note 152, § 40; Robert S. Pinzur, Insurable Interest.- A Search
for Consistency, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 109, 111 (1979). An insurance contract not founded
on an insurable interest is objectionable on two grounds: that the insured may be
tempted to cause the loss, since he or she has nothing to lose and a great deal to gain by
doing so, and that the contract is merely a wager, and thus morally offensive. In the
context of the unearned prepayment fee, the first ground is irrelevant; there is nothing
the lender can do to cause the borrower to sell the real estate, and lenders are most
unlikely to cause fires or other casualty losses to the property securing their loans. But
the prepayment fee clause, in the present context, is indeed a wager.
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of the lender's loss can be perfectly acceptable. But where the
lender has no risk of loss, and triggers the acceleration for the very
purpose of reinvestment of the funds at a profit, the fee constitutes a
windfall to the lender. It is not a restraint on alienation in the tech-
nical sense, 166 but the burden it places on real estate sales is difficult
to justify.
This analysis leads to the following conclusions. When a court
is asked to enforce a prepayment fee incident to acceleration under
a condemnation or casualty insurance clause or a due-on-sale
clause, it should first inquire whether the lender has a legitimate
objection to leaving the loan in place, based on the characteristics of
the proposed new owner, the property, and any collateral offered in
substitution for it. If the answer is negative, the acceleration of the
loan may go forward if the mortgage and local law so dictate, but
the prepayment fee should not be enforced. This approach will per-
mit the fee to serve the proper purpose of compensating the lender
for the risk of being compelled by business necessity to accept pre-
payment in adverse interest market conditions, but will prevent the
lender from using the prepayment clause to exact a fortuitous ad-
vantage where there is no legitimate need for the prepayment to
occur. 
16 7
Some may object that this approach is a throwback to the pre-
Gain Act period, during which many courts enforced due-on-sale
clauses only when the lender's security was placed at greater risk by
the transfer. 168 That rule was quite properly rendered a dead letter
by the Garn Act, and it is now national policy to permit lenders to
use the fortuity of a sale of the property (even a sale to a fully quali-
fied buyer) as a means of gaining the advantage of upward shifts in
interest rates. The approach I advocate here merely ensures that
they cannot use that fortuity to gain a further advantage beyond
that necessary to bring their yield to a market level.
3. Lender Refusal to Respond Under the Due-on-Sale Clause
The structure of due-on-sale clauses raises a further problem.
The clauses are usually worded so that the lender has an option to
166. See supra text accompanying note 48.
167. It might be argued that an attempt by the lender to enforce the prepayment fee
when it has no business need to demand the prepayment reflects a lack of good faith and
should not be recognized under the law of contracts. See Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith
in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299 (1988); Steven J. Burton, Breach
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV.
369 (1980).
168. See sources cited supra note 3.
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accelerate the loan unless the lender gives consent to the transfer.
The problem arises if the lender does neither. The facts of First
Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. Maryland Development Co.,169
somewhat simplified, illustrate the situation well. The borrower's
mortgage contained both a due-on-sale clause and a prepayment fee
clause. The borrower informed the lender that it had negotiated a
sale of the property, and asked whether the lender wished to con-
sent to the sale or to accept prepayment. However, the lender gave
no specific response to the inquiry for nearly four months. The pro-
posed purchaser considered going ahead with the sale and then
waiting to see if the lender would accelerate. But apparently con-
cluding that such a course was too risky, the purchaser instead
completed the sale and paid off the loan, including the prepayment
fee. The purchaser then sued for a refund of the fee, basing its ac-
tion on earlier cases denying enforcement of prepayment fees in
connection with acceleration.170 The lender's response was that it
had never accelerated the loan, and thus that these cases were inap-
posite. The court, rather remarkably, agreed; it characterized the
prepayment as "voluntary" and refused to order the lender to re-
turn the fee.' 7'
The court's attitude was unrealistic. A purchaser of real estate
cannot be expected to close a sale without knowing whether the
lender has consented or not. Doing so would expose the purchaser
to the risk that the lender might finally decide to accelerate some
months or even years after the sale, forcing a refinancing by the
purchaser in much more adverse mortgage market conditions than
existed on the date of the sale. 172 Few buyers would willingly as-
sume such a risk. Hence, as a practical matter, if a lender simply
refuses to either give or deny consent under the due-on-sale clause
within a reasonable time, and if the borrower then prepays the loan
in order to consummate the proposed sale, the lender ought to be
regarded as having accelerated, whether or not it has issued a for-
169. 509 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). The facts and result were similar in First
Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 510 N.E.2d 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
170. See cases cited supra notes 143-145.
171. First Ind. Fed. Say. Bank, 509 N.E.2d at 256.
172. After the passage of some substantial time a court might hold that the lender
had waived the due-on-sale clause or was estopped from enforcing it, especially if the
lender had accepted payments from the new owner. See, e.g., Rakestraw v. Dozier
Assocs., 329 S.E.2d 437, 438 (S.C. 1985) (lender accepted payments for 17 months; held
to have waived due-on-sale clause); Cooper v. Deseret Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (lender's delay of 5 years in enforcement of clause was
unreasonable, and clause had become unenforceable). But it is impossible to predict
with certainty how long a time is necessary to activate these doctrines.
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mal notice of acceleration. Whether the prepayment fee is then col-
lectible should depend on an analysis of the characteristics of the
new owner and the collateral as discussed above.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board recognized this fact in its
regulation prohibiting the collection of prepayment fees by lenders
who accelerate under due-on-sale clauses. 173 Because this regula-
tion applies only to loans on owner-occupied homes, it has little
direct relevance to the present discussion. But the Board dealt as-
tutely with the problem created by the lender that refuses to re-
spond to a request for consent to transfer. Its regulation prohibits
collection of a prepayment fee if the lender
fails to approve within 30 days the completed credit application
of a qualified transferee of the security property to assume the
loan in accordance with the terms of the loan, and thereafter the
borrower transfers the security property to such transferee and
prepays the loan in full within 120 days after receipt by the
lender of the completed credit application. 174
Courts dealing with cases involving income-producing property
should follow the regulation's lead. Whenever a lender fails to give
a reasonably prompt response to a borrower's request for consent to
a proposed sale, if the purchaser and the property qualify under the
lender's ordinary credit and underwriting standards, the prepay-
ment fee should be considered uncollectible. 175
4. Acceleration for Default
The final sort of acceleration with which we must deal is accel-
eration for default. In this setting there can be no serious question
that the prudent lender is entitled to accelerate the loan. The docu-
ments say so, and a lender on a commercial mortgage loan certainly
does not have any obligation to nurse a defaulted borrower along,
unless there exists some defense to acceleration, such as a waiver by
the lender or a breach of some duty owed to the borrower. The
acceleration is a business necessity. Nevertheless, it gives rise to
precisely the risk of reinvestment that prepayment fees are designed
to compensate. Hence, the fee should be enforced if the documents
so provide.
This sort of involuntary acceleration differs in one important
respect from the voluntary prepayment discussed earlier in this Ar-
173. 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1992).
174. Id. § 591.5(b)(3).
175. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 6.5 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
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ticle. There is an intrinsic limitation on voluntary fees: whatever
the stated amount of the fee, it will never exceed the present value
of the savings that the borrower expects to realize by paying off the
loan since no borrower will be willing to pay a fee larger than this.
But in the present context, a prepayment fee incident to an accelera-
tion for default, the borrower has no choice. The default is usually
a consequence of financial conditions beyond the borrower's con-
trol, and he or she cannot simply refrain from making the prepay-
ment, no matter how high the fee. Nonetheless, state law should
enforce the fee, for it represents the risk premium to which the par-
ties agreed. 176 This approach has the added benefit of avoiding for
the courts the difficult and tenuous distinction, already recognized
in a few cases, between "good faith" defaults caused by the bor-
rower's financial exigency and "bad faith" defaults in which the
borrower engaged intentionally for the purpose of inducing an ac-
celeration by the lender and thereby avoiding the prepayment fee. 177
Only one case based on state law dissents from this view. In
Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb, 78 the mortgage provided for a pre-
payment premium of ten percent of the amount prepaid, and stated
that "[tihe premium shall be paid whether prepayment is voluntary
or involuntary, including any prepayment made after exercise of
any acceleration provision contained in this Note or any documents
or instrument executed in connection therewith."1 79 The court, in
an extraordinary exercise of contractual distortion, held:
In the setting of this case, the court construes the word "involun-
tary" to mean actions taken by third parties which force the pay-
ment of the mortgage prematurely. That is not the situation that
exists on the facts in this case. Based upon what is in the record
of this case none of the defendants [borrowers] have taken action
to force Clinton Capital Corporation to accelerate the mortgage
in order to pay it off so that they could avoid a prepayment
penalty. 180
The lesson to be learned from this little episode is that lenders who
expect to collect prepayment fees upon acceleration for default must
176. See Golden Forest Properties v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. Rptr.
316, 319 (Ct. App. 1988) (prepayment fee properly included in debt balance in foreclo-
sure); Pacific Trust Co. TTEE v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 229 Cal. Rptr. 269,
274-75 (Ct. App. 1986) (junior mortgagee must include prepayment fee in amount
necessary to redeem senior mortgage).
177. See cases cited supra notes 147-148.
178. 589 A.2d 1363 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
179. Id. at 1364.
180. Id. at 1371.
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be exceedingly clear in stating that intent. But this aspect of the
case must surely be viewed as an aberration.
5. Clogging the Equity of Redemption
Of much greater interest is the Clinton Capital court's appar-
ent alternative holding: that enforcing the prepayment fee would
constitute a "clog" on the equity of redemption. This argument
must be taken seriously. The clogging doctrine, which is of ancient
origin, holds that the mortgagor has the right to redeem the mort-
gage if the debt has matured, and that any agreement in or created
contemporaneously with a mortgage that impairs that right is unen-
forceable.""' It is based on the notion that mortgagors are usually
incorrigible optimists at the time they sign the mortgage documents,
and hence may well be willing to waive the right to redeem. Such
waivers, if legally enforceable, would probably find their way into
the vast majority of mortgages, effectively eliminating the equity of
redemption, which is considered an important and salutary debtor
protection. Hence such waivers are held unenforceable.
Is a prepayment fee payable upon acceleration for default a vi-
olation of the clogging doctrine? Obviously it does not prohibit re-
demption, but just as obviously it makes redemption more difficult
and burdensome. A similar clogging issue is raised by a provision
for a late fee or an increased rate of interest upon default; such
clauses also employ default as a triggering event to increase the
amount of the debt secured by the mortgage. There is remarkably
little case law on the matter. Professor George Osborne thought
that the courts should hold an interest rate increase upon default
unenforceable as a clog if it produced an additional liability so huge
that the debtor could not possibly pay it.182 He also suggested that
the courts should view more leniently a clause providing for a high
interest rate with a discount or reduction for timely payment, as
distinct from a clause providing for a low rate with an increase for
default. 183 But Osborne's ideas were based largely on speculation
derived from case law dealing with theories other than the clogging
doctrine. Unfortunately, none of the modern cases dealing with late
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 3.1
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 30; Jeffrey
L. Licht, The Clog on the Equity of Redemption and its Effect on Modern Real Estate
Finance, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 452, 452-53 (1986); Laurence G. Preble & David W.
Cartwright, Convertible and Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclogging the Equity of Re-
demption, 20 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 821 (1985).
182. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 97, at 146-47 (2d ed. 1970).
183. See id. at 147.
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charges and with clauses providing for increased interest upon de-
fault or acceleration discuss the clogging doctrine; they treat the
clauses under other theories. Some cases uphold clauses increasing
interest upon default, subject only to whatever restrictions result
from usury statutes; 184 others uphold them if reasonable or "not
unconscionable." ' 18 5 The most common approach is the liquidated
damage/penalty analysis186 discussed and critiqued earlier in this
Article.1 87 Much the same description is applicable to cases chal-
lenging the validity of late fees.188 These tests are notoriously im-
precise and malleable, and their results are widely variable and
unpredictable. None of them consider the clogging issue, and they
provide no useful guidance for our consideration of clogging in the
context of prepayment fees triggered by default and acceleration.
Despite the lack of case law guidance, the clogging issue raised
by prepayment fees on accelerated mortgage loans can be handled
simply. The question should be whether the prepayment fee is serv-
ing in a default situation the same function it serves in a voluntary
prepayment: to compensate for the lender's reinvestment risk. That
184. See In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500, 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (Kansas law);
Harmon v. Bank of Danville, 339 S.E.2d 150, 153 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
185. Travelers Ins. Co. v. 100 LaSalle Assocs., No. 90 C 4728, 1991 WL 23692, at
*3 (N.D. 111. 1991); NI Indus., Inc. v. Husker-Hawkeye Distrib., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 157,
161 (Neb. 1989); Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
186. See, e.g., In re DWS Invs., Inc., 121 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990)
(probably unenforceable under California law); In re White, 88 B.R. 498, 511 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1988) (Massachusetts law); O'Connor v. Televideo Sys., 267 Cal. Rptr. 237,
242-43 (Ct. App. 1990); Chemical Bank v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 535
N.E.2d 940, 946-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Papo v. Aglo Restaurants, Inc., 386 N.W.2d
177, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Emery v. Fishmarket Inn, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823
(App. Div. 1991).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 78-97.
188. For cases applying a liquidated damages/penalty analysis, see In re Holiday
Mart, Inc., 9 B.R. 99, 107-08 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981) (late fee is unreasonable estimate
of lender's damages, and is an unenforceable penalty under Hawaii law); In re Jordan,
91 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (late fee unenforceable under Pennsylvania
law); Garrett v. Coast & Southern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 511 P.2d 1197, 1202-03
(Cal. 1973); Willis v. Community Developers, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (since lender's damages are always measurable by interest, damages are not diffi-
cult to ascertain and late fee is an unenforceable penalty); Crest Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Mason, 581 A.2d 120, 121-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (fate charges normally
enforceable, but may not be collected after filing of foreclosure action); see also In re
Bryant, 39 B.R. 313, 323-24 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984) (late fees did not violate usury
statute, but constituted unenforceable penalty under liquidated damage analysis);
Begelfer v. Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167, 173 (Mass. 1980) (late fees violated usury stat-
ute); Collins v. Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610, 618 (Nev. 1983) (late fees
charged by federal savings and loan association were valid under regulation of Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which preempted state law).
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risk to the lender is, of course, precisely the same whether the pre-
payment results from the borrower's default or the borrower's deci-
sion to pay off the debt. If the fee is the same amount in both
contexts (as it usually is, being governed by the same clause), a
court should almost certainly find that the same function is being
served and should uphold the fee for the reasons discussed earlier in
connection with voluntary prepayments. After all, a requirement
that the borrower in default pay exactly the same amount to redeem
that would be demanded of a borrower not in default can hardly be
a clog. On the other hand, if the mortgage provides for a prepay-
ment fee upon default and acceleration that is significantly greater
than the fee due on a voluntary prepayment, a serious question can
be raised as to its legitimacy, and it might well be regarded as a clog
on the equity of redemption. In Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb,
discussed above,18 9 the prepayment clause treated prepayment in
default and nondefault situations identically, and the court was in-
correct in suggesting that the clause violated the clogging doctrine.
6. The Impact of Bankruptcy on Prepayment Incident to
Default
The intervention of bankruptcy should affect enforceability of a
prepayment fee clause triggered by the borrower's default in pre-
cisely the same way that bankruptcy affects nondefault prepayments
as discussed earlier in this Article. Once the bankruptcy court has
crossed the hurdle of state law enforceability, it must still grapple
with the application of section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The
prepayment fee is plainly a "fee" within the meaning of that section,
whether triggered by a default or the borrower's voluntary decision
to prepay. If the policy considerations underlying that section-
protection of subordinate and unsecured creditors against the deple-
tion of the collateral by excessive and unwise fee obligations entered
into by the debtor-are sufficient to warrant limitations on enforce-
ment of prepayment fees when the payment is voluntary (and I have
already suggested that they are), the same is true when prepayment
results from the borrower's default.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested in this Article that to comport with economic
efficiency, changes are needed in the law governing "locked-in"
mortgage loans. First, courts should abandon the "perfect tender in
189. See supra text accompanying notes 178-180.
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time" rule and mortgage loans should be freely prepayable if the
documents make no mention of prepayment. This change will im-
pose no burden on commercial mortgage lenders, who routinely in-
sert clauses covering the matter in their documents, and it will
avoid the occasional case in which the mortgagor naturally but er-
roneously believes that the loan can be prepaid because the docu-
ments are silent. Second, the courts should refuse to enforce the
absolute lock-in of a mortgage loan, but under the concept of "effi-
cient breach" should instead permit prepayment if the borrower is
willing to pay the lender's damages, either as determined by a trial
if necessary or as fixed by a prepayment fee clause.
In general, courts should enforce prepayment fee clauses with-
out reference to their amount or supposed reasonableness. Except
in transactions involving unsophisticated borrowers who are not
represented by counsel, or for some other reason lack the ability to
understand and bargain over the clause, "protection" of borrowers
by the courts is not needed or warranted, and indeed may interfere
with economic efficiency. When the borrower is in bankruptcy,
however, a court may be warranted in limiting the amount of the
prepayment fee to the lender's actual damages as a means of avoid-
ing the depletion of the debtor's estate at the expense of junior and
unsecured creditors. Intervention of this sort is particularly appro-
priate when the clause is one that seems designed not merely to
liquidate the lender's damages, but to overstate them in a systematic
manner.
In most cases, enforcement of prepayment fee clauses is justi-
fied even when the prepayment results from an "involuntary" accel-
eration of the debt by the lender, provided that the mortgage
documents so state. However, the lender should not be privileged
to collect the fee if the acceleration was done with no business justi-
fication other than the lender's desire to obtain prepayment of the
loan. Such unjustified accelerations are a real possibility when an
eminent domain taking or insured casualty loss occurs but the prop-
erty can be restored with no loss of security value or the borrower
offers adequate substitute security, or when the borrower's transfer
of the property triggers a due-on-sale clause. Courts should scruti-
nize the lender's conduct in such cases carefully.
Finally, the courts should not permit a prepayment fee clause
to obstruct the borrower's equitable right of redemption. The sim-
plest way to prevent this is to refuse enforcement of a clause provid-
ing for a larger fee for acceleration for default than for a voluntary
prepayment. But where the documents merely impose the same fee
[Vol. 40:851
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whether prepayment is voluntary or a result of acceleration for de-
fault, the clause should be fully enforceable.
I have attempted to use the perspective of economics to
examine prepayment restrictions and fees. Some may argue that
economic analysis embodies too restrictive a view of the world, and
that it fails to account for normative considerations, such as the
morality of the parties' agreement and the fairness of enforcing it.
There may be situations in which these factors should
predominate, 190 but I think they are rare in commercial mortgage
transactions. In the absence of a bargaining failure (as occurs often
in consumer adhesion contracts but seldom in commercial mort-
gage loans), some overriding policy (such as the protection of
subordinate and unsecured creditors in bankruptcy), or an attempt
to enforce in bad faith (as when the lender has no business need to
demand an "involuntary" acceleration), the parties' agreement con-
cerning prepayment fees should be enforced. A court that refuses to
do so substitutes its own judgment for that of the parties, and its
judgment will usually be inferior in quality and economically ineffi-
cient in result.
190. See Eric G. Andersen & Steven J. Burton, The World of a Contract, 75 IowA
L. REV. 861 (1990).
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